Japan was the most successful none Western country to achieve as much power as other Western countries. We start this history with the Tokugawa. The Western threat led the Japanese to need to modernize their military. In the 1600s, new military technology led the Tokugawa Shogunate to unify Japan. The Tokugawa, weary of outside powers, limited Japan's trading to only agree to trade with the Chinese and the Dutch.The Tokugawa brought Japan about 2.5 centuries of peace.
Before the Tokugawa, Japan was divided into thousands of competing units. These units consisted of daimyos who had their own private armies full of Samurai. The system itself resembled European feudalism with a few distinct differences. The Tokugawa's, "Political centralization was both a cause and a consequence of the military changes." (Curtin 158)The Tokugawa brought about huge social and economic changes. Agricultural output approximately doubled between 1600 and 1850. (Curtin 160) Historians think that two things may have been important to Japan's successful modernization: The 250 years of relative external peace, and the inner struggles in Japan itself.
In the 1860s and 70s a revolution hit Japan.By 1868 the Meiji emperor had been restored. However, the emperor himself had little more. The society was an oligarchy with an aristocratic government under the emperor who basically made all the decisions. This oligarchy modernized Japanese society by borrowing techniques and institution from the West.
Military technology promoted most of Japan's growth.In 1842, after China had been bombarded by Britain's Navy, the Japanese realized they needed to modernize militarily quickly. The American fleet arriving in Japan in 1852 also showed Japan how it needed to modernize quickly. The sides which revolted against the Tokugawa were military oligarchies competing to perform the same tasks. At the same time, the oligarchies claimed that they would retain Japanese traditions, but within a decade they had removed the daimyo and bakufu. The new oligarchy changed the balance of power in Japan by modernizing the army and setting up a Western-style government.
Most other countries trying to modernize militarily focused on getting Western guns and letting the West supply them with guns. Japan not only did this, but started producing the weapons in their own factories in order to lose their dependency on the West.
The West had begun its industrialization with small textile and labor saving machines. But by the time Japan entered the game, bigger industries had been created. Japan decided to focus first on heavy industry and mining technology instead of following the exact route that the west did.
The new Japanese industries were created by the state for military purposes. But by the 1880s the industries went through privatization. By the 1890s a relationship between the industry and the government had been formed. Japan's only real similarity to the West remained technological, the government itself may have seemed Western but it had a lot of Japanese aspects to it.
Japan also needed to show the world that it was on equal footing with the West. Modernization was to protect Japan against the hostile west, but it also needed to show the west it could take care of itself. The first thing Japan needed to do was have a modernized military to show the world it could defend itself. It also adopted a constitution to show the West it was civilized.
The Constitution itself could not be change by anybody except the emperor. In fact, people changed constitution practice leading to the militarism in the 30s and 40s. When it was stated that only military men could fill the posts of minister of war and minister of the navy, it narrowed the prime ministers options dramatically and led to a more militaristic state. The Western models in Japan were always slightly different then those in the West.
In general leaders in all the countries which went through defensive modernization failed to see the obvious change which the west was making the world go through. In the end the only reason why they modernized was to protect themselves and have certain Western habits which seemed nice.
How come the Ganda were overcome by the West, but the Japanese were not, even though the stories have so much in common? What were the benefits of only letting the Chinese and Dutch trade with them in their early modernization days? Why didn't the west ever launch an assault on Japan?
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
Monday, October 29, 2007
The VOC (Dutch East-India Company) was created around the same time as the BEIC. It also had many of the same rights which the BEIC had.Spices were a huge commodity. They were low bulk but could be sold at high prices. The Europeans acted as the middle man for all products except spices. By 1500, coffee was grown in souther Yemen. They then sold coffee to Arabia. As the Arabians couldn't drink alcohol, they drank coffee instead. Very few peasants were involved in the International coffee trade. By the mid 1600s-1700s, coffee houses started appearing across European port towns. Coffee houses were perfect for port towns where business men would meet to discuss and make trades. The demand for coffee increased and the BEIC and VOC decided to try and make peasants in the countries they grow it. The British failed to grow coffee, but the Dutch were able to grow coffee in Java. The Dutch demanded that peasants in Java grow coffee, the Javanese peasants didn't want to. The Portuguese also tried to grow coffee. They brought in African slaves to grow coffee in Brazil. This created a class called the coffee barons who held a lot of power.The BEIC and Britain tried to grow coffee in Kenya.
Places where coffee is grown now are European footprints of where they tried to force the production of coffee.
The VOC's goal was to control the spice trade, and they did so through conquest. The VOC was giving 18% dividends to its investors (quite a good dividend). The VOC ends up becoming involved with governments and forms a powerful military. The VOC controlled all of Indonesia. The Japanese only allowed the Dutch to trade with them. The Dutch had access to one port, which led to the Japanese Dutch education. The VOC was liquidated in 1800 for 2 reasons: Napoleon took over and needed money. Other interests in Holland which wanted more power which the VOC had. The VOC had a moment of weakness so the other companies took over.
Places where coffee is grown now are European footprints of where they tried to force the production of coffee.
The VOC's goal was to control the spice trade, and they did so through conquest. The VOC was giving 18% dividends to its investors (quite a good dividend). The VOC ends up becoming involved with governments and forms a powerful military. The VOC controlled all of Indonesia. The Japanese only allowed the Dutch to trade with them. The Dutch had access to one port, which led to the Japanese Dutch education. The VOC was liquidated in 1800 for 2 reasons: Napoleon took over and needed money. Other interests in Holland which wanted more power which the VOC had. The VOC had a moment of weakness so the other companies took over.
September 28th, 2007
The BEIC (British East India Company) and VOC were governments within governments. They didn't have autonomy, but they had a lot of things governments could do. BEIC was a political power in India. Their officer core was British but had a lot of Indians. BEIC had 125 investors who put in 72,000 pounds into the company. States were strapped for cash. A lot of states feared states with economic power. It could threaten the government, a lot of government wouldn't let that happen. A lot of governments gave and took monopolies without warning. They didn't want anybody to take away sovereignty. In Europe this option isn't available. Governments create companies where wealthy people will invest. Both government and wealth people can make money off of this arrangement. these are called Rentier States: government creates an enterprise which it takes off to the top of.
The BEIC originally had a charter of 21 year. This was in case the company grew too large. BEIC became useful to the Mughal empire. The BEIC received certain ports where it could sell its goods. At the same time the BEIC took Indian goods to Western Europe. This brings a lot of revenue to the Mughals, especially as their navy cannot reach Europe. The BEIC became a Mughal vassel. By 1670 Charles the 1st allowed for the BEIC to acquire territory (as it already sort of had a military), bring currency, build fortresses, make alliances, create war and peace, and make its own laws.It basically becomes a government.
The BEIC is a charter of the British royalty, it places its loyalty in the throne, not the parliament. At the same time, the BEIC bribes people in parliament so that they will not allow other private companies to join in on their profits (make sure they stay a monopoly). The BEIC now finds itself under British and Mughal protection. The crown gave the BEIC more power so that it would gain more money. All trade with India would be handled by BEIC, killing all other competition.
By 1750s: Mughal Empire starts breaking up to form other empires. A battle between the French and the British began, trade war. The war mainly occurred in the West Indies and India. The BEIC felt threatened by French companies. When the French lost the war, the BEIC assumed all the trading roles in India. By 1800, the BEIC controls most of India.
The BEIC becomes an important world player.
The BEIC originally had a charter of 21 year. This was in case the company grew too large. BEIC became useful to the Mughal empire. The BEIC received certain ports where it could sell its goods. At the same time the BEIC took Indian goods to Western Europe. This brings a lot of revenue to the Mughals, especially as their navy cannot reach Europe. The BEIC became a Mughal vassel. By 1670 Charles the 1st allowed for the BEIC to acquire territory (as it already sort of had a military), bring currency, build fortresses, make alliances, create war and peace, and make its own laws.It basically becomes a government.
The BEIC is a charter of the British royalty, it places its loyalty in the throne, not the parliament. At the same time, the BEIC bribes people in parliament so that they will not allow other private companies to join in on their profits (make sure they stay a monopoly). The BEIC now finds itself under British and Mughal protection. The crown gave the BEIC more power so that it would gain more money. All trade with India would be handled by BEIC, killing all other competition.
By 1750s: Mughal Empire starts breaking up to form other empires. A battle between the French and the British began, trade war. The war mainly occurred in the West Indies and India. The BEIC felt threatened by French companies. When the French lost the war, the BEIC assumed all the trading roles in India. By 1800, the BEIC controls most of India.
The BEIC becomes an important world player.
Sunday, October 28, 2007
Curtin Chapter 8
Curtin Chapter 8
Curtin begins this chapter by talking about agriculture: how it came to be, and when it came to be in different parts of the world (as far as we know). He's using agriculture to talk about the broader idea of diffusion. Of course the rate of diffusion depends mostly on the size of the population and the modes of transportation (in our modern world, ideas spread much more rapidly across the globe then they did in the stone age). With diffusion taking on a more major role in history, we can see a progression where intercommunication has become more global, cheaper, and faster. Curtin uses Islam and gunpowder as examples of diffusion. With diffusion also comes non-diffusion. An example of non-diffusion would be the Romans' refusal to use stirrups. They had seen stirrups and their effectiveness, but they chose to stick with chariots. We can also see one-sided non-diffusion. For example, when the west borrowed ideas from the Chinese, but the Chinese did not borrow back. Sometimes diffusion, though not necessarily wanted, becomes necessary to keep up with growing technology. For example, the Chinese alphabet and language has become a burden to computer programmers. Instead they tend to use English instead of Chinese. From the middle ages the West found itself borrowing a lot of things from the rest of the world. The West combined borrowing and innovation to create new techs which were better then the ones they borrowed. Asians before 1700, on the other hand, had no intention of borrowing from the West. When the West's production far outmatched that of the Asians, many Asians wanted the same productivity, but they did not want to lost their own sense of identity. However, at the same time if a country were to be taken over by a Western country, their whole way of life would be threatened. This meant that countries needed to modernize in order to avoid annexation by the West. This usually meant beginning with military modernization, imitations of Western military technology and methods. Military modernization couldn't be done without a certain amount of imitation in social ways, education, and political life. Curtin then goes into the Neo-Inca resistance because it was one of the earliest examples of defensive modernization with the Inca borrowing some things from Spanish culture and keeping some of their own culture. Peter in Russia decided to modernize, not only for defense, but also to expand the Russian empire. Peter's modernization did not just stop with the military. Peter attempted to take anything from the West which could make Russia more of a contender on the world scene. In Ganda two things interested them the most: arms and religion. Ganda was able to use both to channel and limit European influence. Of course there were social consequences. The office of Kabaka was strengthened at the expense of other elite groups. Client-chiefs ended up gaining a lot of power. When Uganda came to be, a landlord class was created. Ganda borrowed from the West but did not change their societies in a Western manner. Ganda did not want to imitate Europe, they just wanted to protect their values by borrowing a few concepts. Hawaii was a good example of how a country needed to give the appearance of being a Western style country in order to wade off annexation. In the 1820s, European and American missionaries came and helped the Monarchy in Hawaii form a Western-Style, making Western countries think that the island could handle its own political affairs. Hawaii avoided annexation by partly modernizing society and by playing Euro rivalries against each other (kind of like Mutesa). However, by the 1890s, a series of coups and counter coups showed that the west was gaining more influence in Hawaii. Also with the U.S.'s new wish to become an imperial country, Hawaii could be a good door to move to the East. In Madagascar the quick acquisition of firearms allowed for it to create a secondary empire. Missionaries came in 1820, and had converted the island by 1869. Imerina enjoyed quite a few Western aspects but their system was mostly based on forced-labor and slavery. They lacked the flexible Western administration and any kind of popular support. This meant that when the French came, the modernized army lacked administrative support and only had a minor resistance to the French invaders. Siam, on the other hand, was so successful with its military and social organization that it never came under European control (though parts of the Siamese empire). In the mid 1800s, Siam began the road for military organization. The Siamese played the French in Indochina against the British in Malaya. But this came at a price, it had to cede certain territories to France and some to Britain. The Siamese also started modernizing the administration. Siam created an effective tax base, and a system of public education.
Curtin begins this chapter by talking about agriculture: how it came to be, and when it came to be in different parts of the world (as far as we know). He's using agriculture to talk about the broader idea of diffusion. Of course the rate of diffusion depends mostly on the size of the population and the modes of transportation (in our modern world, ideas spread much more rapidly across the globe then they did in the stone age). With diffusion taking on a more major role in history, we can see a progression where intercommunication has become more global, cheaper, and faster. Curtin uses Islam and gunpowder as examples of diffusion. With diffusion also comes non-diffusion. An example of non-diffusion would be the Romans' refusal to use stirrups. They had seen stirrups and their effectiveness, but they chose to stick with chariots. We can also see one-sided non-diffusion. For example, when the west borrowed ideas from the Chinese, but the Chinese did not borrow back. Sometimes diffusion, though not necessarily wanted, becomes necessary to keep up with growing technology. For example, the Chinese alphabet and language has become a burden to computer programmers. Instead they tend to use English instead of Chinese. From the middle ages the West found itself borrowing a lot of things from the rest of the world. The West combined borrowing and innovation to create new techs which were better then the ones they borrowed. Asians before 1700, on the other hand, had no intention of borrowing from the West. When the West's production far outmatched that of the Asians, many Asians wanted the same productivity, but they did not want to lost their own sense of identity. However, at the same time if a country were to be taken over by a Western country, their whole way of life would be threatened. This meant that countries needed to modernize in order to avoid annexation by the West. This usually meant beginning with military modernization, imitations of Western military technology and methods. Military modernization couldn't be done without a certain amount of imitation in social ways, education, and political life. Curtin then goes into the Neo-Inca resistance because it was one of the earliest examples of defensive modernization with the Inca borrowing some things from Spanish culture and keeping some of their own culture. Peter in Russia decided to modernize, not only for defense, but also to expand the Russian empire. Peter's modernization did not just stop with the military. Peter attempted to take anything from the West which could make Russia more of a contender on the world scene. In Ganda two things interested them the most: arms and religion. Ganda was able to use both to channel and limit European influence. Of course there were social consequences. The office of Kabaka was strengthened at the expense of other elite groups. Client-chiefs ended up gaining a lot of power. When Uganda came to be, a landlord class was created. Ganda borrowed from the West but did not change their societies in a Western manner. Ganda did not want to imitate Europe, they just wanted to protect their values by borrowing a few concepts. Hawaii was a good example of how a country needed to give the appearance of being a Western style country in order to wade off annexation. In the 1820s, European and American missionaries came and helped the Monarchy in Hawaii form a Western-Style, making Western countries think that the island could handle its own political affairs. Hawaii avoided annexation by partly modernizing society and by playing Euro rivalries against each other (kind of like Mutesa). However, by the 1890s, a series of coups and counter coups showed that the west was gaining more influence in Hawaii. Also with the U.S.'s new wish to become an imperial country, Hawaii could be a good door to move to the East. In Madagascar the quick acquisition of firearms allowed for it to create a secondary empire. Missionaries came in 1820, and had converted the island by 1869. Imerina enjoyed quite a few Western aspects but their system was mostly based on forced-labor and slavery. They lacked the flexible Western administration and any kind of popular support. This meant that when the French came, the modernized army lacked administrative support and only had a minor resistance to the French invaders. Siam, on the other hand, was so successful with its military and social organization that it never came under European control (though parts of the Siamese empire). In the mid 1800s, Siam began the road for military organization. The Siamese played the French in Indochina against the British in Malaya. But this came at a price, it had to cede certain territories to France and some to Britain. The Siamese also started modernizing the administration. Siam created an effective tax base, and a system of public education.
Curtin Chapter 7
Curtin Chapter 7
Curtin asks the question in Chapter 7, why did other culture switch to other forms of belief. He states how modern religions have a doctrinal basis meant to convert non-believers. But he admits that there had to be something else in play because so many countries did not convert. Curtin believes that religious change came from a response by the converted peoples. In this chapter Curtin explorers the reaction to missionaries by East Africa and more specifically Buganda. East Africa cannot be considered typical and Buganda can be considered unique. Before 1800 the main outsiders to come to East Africa were Arabs. The Arabs created trade diasporas and fortified towns. They never attempted to rule over East African territory. In the 1800s two economic situations happened: the price of ivory shot up which created an increase in exports, and cloves of spices were found to grow extremely well in Zazibar and Pemba which created a need for labor which would be satisfied by an increase in the slave trade. In the early 1800s the Sultan of Muscat in Oman wanted to increase his commercial advantage. Soon after the Afro-Arab trading diaspora turned into an Omani trading empire. In the mid 1800s, Zanzibar and Swahili began moving into the interior of East Africa and created a secondary empire. By the 1890s Britain had officially made Zanzibar a protectorate (before that it had a lot of influence on Zanzibar). Christian missionaries began to appear in the 1840s. In some regions missionaries created small secondary empires. In general though, missionaries liked entering big kingdoms like Buganda which had already begun creating secondary empires. This gave the missionaries security.
The ruler with the title of Kubaka (the King) was called Mutesa I. He had modernized the army to include muskets as its primary weapon. Buganda also had administrative organization with its political constitution. The system in Buganda led there to be many clan leaders who the King had to rule over and through. By the 1700s the Kabaka were putting in Bakungu or Client-Chiefs, who could be removed by the Kabaka (this got rid of the lineage aspect to the constitution). The Kabaka also sent a multitude of semiprofessional warriors all around the country who were only loyal to the Kabaka. The client-chiefs controlled the allocation of land on a provincial level and therefore controlled the wealth of the country which was largely based on the peasantry. Buganda had no substantial opponents after it modernized to firearms. Swahili caravans had come to Buganda with shipments of guns, but also with the first attempts to convert Buganda to Islam. By the 1870s, European employees for the Egyptian government had come down to extend Egypt's secondary empire. In 1875, Henry Morton Stanley had passed through Buganda and had talked politics with Mutesa. In a famous message to the daily telegraph he stated that Mutas was interested in Christianity. To be sure, Mutesa did want Christian missionaries in his court to balance the influence of Islamic missionaries. There were two Christian groups in Buganda, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the White Fathers. Both made strong attempts to convert Mutesa to their version of Christianity. To Mutesa the Christians offered technical knowledge and strategic insight about the threatening world beyond the African Lake district. By 1879 the Islamic influence had passed and left Mutesa's court. Though not useful to Mutesa anymore, he kept the Christin missionaries in case they might become useful again. When Mutesa died a crisis between different factions began. Mwanga, Mutesa's son, took power. He increased his power as the despot, and simultaneously increased the power of the military. In 1888, a revolt led to the exile of Mawnga and a four sided civil war. In 1893, Britain annexed Buganda with the help of the protestant factions which established themselves in Mutesa's court. This is one of the examples when missionaries came before colonization. The missionaries entered hoping to use the favorable political conditions in the country. However, the existence of all these different religions in Buganda has led to some resentment by the Muslims who aren't in power.
Curtin asks the question in Chapter 7, why did other culture switch to other forms of belief. He states how modern religions have a doctrinal basis meant to convert non-believers. But he admits that there had to be something else in play because so many countries did not convert. Curtin believes that religious change came from a response by the converted peoples. In this chapter Curtin explorers the reaction to missionaries by East Africa and more specifically Buganda. East Africa cannot be considered typical and Buganda can be considered unique. Before 1800 the main outsiders to come to East Africa were Arabs. The Arabs created trade diasporas and fortified towns. They never attempted to rule over East African territory. In the 1800s two economic situations happened: the price of ivory shot up which created an increase in exports, and cloves of spices were found to grow extremely well in Zazibar and Pemba which created a need for labor which would be satisfied by an increase in the slave trade. In the early 1800s the Sultan of Muscat in Oman wanted to increase his commercial advantage. Soon after the Afro-Arab trading diaspora turned into an Omani trading empire. In the mid 1800s, Zanzibar and Swahili began moving into the interior of East Africa and created a secondary empire. By the 1890s Britain had officially made Zanzibar a protectorate (before that it had a lot of influence on Zanzibar). Christian missionaries began to appear in the 1840s. In some regions missionaries created small secondary empires. In general though, missionaries liked entering big kingdoms like Buganda which had already begun creating secondary empires. This gave the missionaries security.
The ruler with the title of Kubaka (the King) was called Mutesa I. He had modernized the army to include muskets as its primary weapon. Buganda also had administrative organization with its political constitution. The system in Buganda led there to be many clan leaders who the King had to rule over and through. By the 1700s the Kabaka were putting in Bakungu or Client-Chiefs, who could be removed by the Kabaka (this got rid of the lineage aspect to the constitution). The Kabaka also sent a multitude of semiprofessional warriors all around the country who were only loyal to the Kabaka. The client-chiefs controlled the allocation of land on a provincial level and therefore controlled the wealth of the country which was largely based on the peasantry. Buganda had no substantial opponents after it modernized to firearms. Swahili caravans had come to Buganda with shipments of guns, but also with the first attempts to convert Buganda to Islam. By the 1870s, European employees for the Egyptian government had come down to extend Egypt's secondary empire. In 1875, Henry Morton Stanley had passed through Buganda and had talked politics with Mutesa. In a famous message to the daily telegraph he stated that Mutas was interested in Christianity. To be sure, Mutesa did want Christian missionaries in his court to balance the influence of Islamic missionaries. There were two Christian groups in Buganda, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the White Fathers. Both made strong attempts to convert Mutesa to their version of Christianity. To Mutesa the Christians offered technical knowledge and strategic insight about the threatening world beyond the African Lake district. By 1879 the Islamic influence had passed and left Mutesa's court. Though not useful to Mutesa anymore, he kept the Christin missionaries in case they might become useful again. When Mutesa died a crisis between different factions began. Mwanga, Mutesa's son, took power. He increased his power as the despot, and simultaneously increased the power of the military. In 1888, a revolt led to the exile of Mawnga and a four sided civil war. In 1893, Britain annexed Buganda with the help of the protestant factions which established themselves in Mutesa's court. This is one of the examples when missionaries came before colonization. The missionaries entered hoping to use the favorable political conditions in the country. However, the existence of all these different religions in Buganda has led to some resentment by the Muslims who aren't in power.
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
What Hope Remains? Myanmar Crisis. Crit Analysis
Julien Benichou
Tom Laichas
What hope remains?
With a conflict in Burma coming to a close (or so it looks), one has to stop to wonder why the oppressive military dictatorship remains in power. Can we lay blame somewhere? Should the U.N. have done more for Burma? These are all pertinent questions which may or may not have adequate answers. Will Burma ever have independence from the Junta?
The Mon people were the first to arrive in Burma, and are suspected of having ruled Burma by the mid 900s. They were some of the first people to embrace Theravada Buddhism. Then the Tibeto-Burman Pyu arrived in the 1st century B.C. They created city states and traded actively with the Mon Kingdom. As the Pyu Kingdom fell apart in about 1044, another group who caled the Burman, or the Bamar, created their own Kingdom. King Anawrahta captured the Mon Kingdom and most of what is known as present day Burma; this Kingdom came to be known as Bagan as the capital was Bagan. The Bagan Kingdom adopted Theravada Buddhism. In the 13th century, as Bagan's power slowly faded, the Mongols led by Kublai Kahn took over the northern segment of Bagan and sacked the capital city. The Mongols didn't stay long; which led the Tai-Shan people from Yunnan to take over and become a major player in South East Asian politics. The Tai-Shan broke up the original Bagan Kingdom into several sections: 1. The Burman Kingdom of Ava or Innwa in upper Burma. 2.The Mon Kingdom of Hanthawady Pegu or Bago in the South. 3.The Rakhine Kingdom in the west. 4. Several states in the east and north-east. Realize now that all these Kingdoms and states were still under Shan rulers. These Kingdoms warred a lot (especially the Ava and Bago), but Buddhism did flourish in all the nations. In 1540, the Burman Kingdom of Taungoo under Tabinshwehti, reinforced by the Ava, defeated the Bago in the South. Tabinshwehti's successor, King Bayinnaug conquered upper Burma, Manipur, Shan states, Chiang Mai, Ayutthaya, and Lan Xang; putting most of south-east Asia under his control. Bayinnaug's death basically led to the end of the Empire and the loss of most of this territory for much of Burma. Rakhine forces, aided by Portugese mercenaries, ended up invading the Kingdom's capital Bago and taking the most important seaport Thanlynin. The Portuguese mercenaries overthrew the Rakhine government in Burma and created their own government. The Burmese were able to retake their kingdom from the Portuguese in 1611, rebuild their country, and remained steadily strong. Until 1648 when the kingdom went on an 100 year decline. The Mon, aided by the French, successfully rebelled in 1740 and took South Burma. Eventually they took over North Burma as well. The Konbaung dynasty formed, and lasted until the British invasion in in 1852. The Konbaung took over Siam numerous times (though they were also thrown out numerous times), resisted invasion attempts by China multiple times, and conquered Rakhine. In 1819, the Burmese annexed a kingdom called Assam, which put their adjacent to British East India. In 1824 the British attacked Burma and ended up taking large amounts of East Burman territory. In 1852, the British faced a much weaker Burma and took over most of Southern Burman provinces. In 1885, alarmed by the French's taking of Laos, the British invaded North Burma. The British occupation of Burma was interrupted multiple times by small coups and revolts which continuously failed. In the 1940s, Aung San created the Burman Independence Army to attempt to free Burma from British Rule. In 1947, Aung San became the Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council, but was assassinated soon after. In 1948, Burma became an independent Democratic nation. In 1962, the Democratic nation was toppled by a military coup d'etat. The current military rulers are called the Junta and came to power in a rebellion in 1988.
In 1990, two years after the Junta came to power, a promised Democratic Parliamentary election was to take place. The National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of Aung San), won 392 out of the 485 seats contested.(Fuller). The National Union Party, the Junta, only won ten seats. The Junta immediately overturned the election and kept power for itself. Aun San Suu Kyi was put under house arrest and forced either to remain under house arrest or leave the country forever (she remains under house arrest to this day). Many ethnic guerilla groups formed and attempted to overthrow the government but the Junta swiftly and effectively crushed these groups (it continued to crush any groups which arose through the 90s and 2000s). The false election and violent methods of the Junta alarmed the International Community which assailed the Junta with criticism and at the same time asked that the Junta adhere to the election's results. The Junta in essence ignored this criticism and the effort made by the U.N. to legitimize the election. In June of 1993 the Junta promised to have a National Convention and write up a constitution. The National Convention does meet every once in a while, but there have been no signs of efforts to actually follow through with the promise of a constitution. On the 23 June, 1993, Burma entered the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The military government in 2006 changed the capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw (city of the kinds), basically a small city created for the top Junta officials. An oasis for the rich Junta leaders far from the poor civilians of Yangon.
Last August the Junta found itself facing Massive Protests after it raised the price of gas and diesel oil by 500% (wow that is pretty ridiculous). It did so in order to attempt to fill a budget deficit from an increase in civil servants' pay. This deficit may also have come from the 2006 move from Yangon to Naypyidaw. The Junta quickly crushed these early protests. On September 19th hundreds of Buddhist monks staged protests against the Junta. The Buddhist monks are a very strong legitimate power in Burma second only to the Junta. The Junta became increasingly strict resulting in: multiples injuries and deaths, many detainees, curfews, limitations on Internet access... The Junta not only reacted violently, but also performed late night raids on anybody who they considered dangerous to their regime. They arrested and detained hundreds of monks and civilians. Nobody is sure what happened to them, but supposedly quite a few have been set free (though many assume that many of them were murdered). The conflict seems to have ended for the time being and nobody can really say when the conflict will start up again.
We now must ask ourselves, who's left to fight against the Junta? The Junta have restricted education to limit the amount of student activism. Students have always been at the forefront of rebellion, and were at the forefront of the 1988 uprising. All political groups except that of the Junta's have been crushed. The most prominent leader of the opposing political group, Aung San Suu Kyi, remains under house arrest. Any new political leaders get killed or incarcerated (The Junta is not stupid enough to kill Aung San Suu Kyi). The Junta have nothing to fear from opposing political groups. The population has been completely frightened: when government cars roam around the streets late at night warning you that if you step out of line that you will be taken away, who can blame them. They also have no weapons, Burma has a very strict gun control policy (except for the military of course). Blunt objects versus guns usually turns out badly. Also half the population is part of an organization which is meat to spy on the general populace. People can't trust their neighbors anymore because they could be informers. The 1988 uprising also worked because government officials joined in the protests, but where are they now? As stated above they have just received a pay raise, in fact they are probably the most well off after people in the military. They risk much more then the civilians by getting involved in these political protests. Though, if they did get involved, it would cause severe internal damage to the Junta. The monks also play a key role in the opposition to the Junta. Being passive by nature, seeing monks out in the streets protesting has awakened the world to the problem in Myanmar. The monks also have a certain amount of respect from the people, this leads them to have a certain amount of power over the people's conscious. Any harm done to the monks could bring real social problems for the Junta. The Junta dealt with the monks using night raids and none-lethal capture methods. Though capturing monks still angered civilians, the Junta would have faced much deeper hatred and resentment had they openly attacked and/or killed monks in the street. Not many people actually saw these night raids so they couldn't truly understand what had gone on. At the same time by not using lethal force against the monks they have curbed the wrath of the people. According to Tom Laichas, the Junta opposition would have a good chance if the middle military officials got tired of what they were doing and revolted. This would either lead to a civil war or the forfeit and flee of the higher up military officials in the Junta. What would happen if the middle officers gained power? I have no idea. They might continue with the idea of a military dictatorship with a few changes. Ideally they would hand over the power to the people. However, it doesn't seem likely that the middle officials will rebel anytime soon.
The Junta have taken care of the situation in a pragmatic fashion. They have come to completely understand how the international community and system would react. Burma's neighboring countries do not want a civil war there because of the amount of refugees that would cross the border to their country. At the same time countries such as China and Russia do not want U.N. intervention because they have their own areas seeking independence. The U.N. did send a special envoy to Myanmar. But even Ban Ki-Moon admits that the mission was not a “success”. In fact all they really achieved was to give a “strong message” to the Junta about the violent crack down on the protests. If that message could have ever had any validity, it would have been before the protests ended. The Junta play the game: the U.N. idly sits by waiting for the Junta to get everything back in order before they go inspect. The leader of the Junta, Senior General Than Shwe kept the U.N. enoy leader, Ibrahim Gambari, waiting for three days before meeting with him. I don't see any kind of outrage at such a disrespectful act against the U.N. The Junta understands how powerless the U.N. and international law have become (I mean even the U.S. doesn't follow international law according to many experts), and therefore have no incentives to heed the U.N.'s warnings. The U.N. didn't intervene in Burma when the election of 1990 was reversed and a major crack down on political parties began, why would they intervene now?
At the same time how effective can we deem these non-violent protests? Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won the Novel-Peace Prize in 1991 for her non-violent acts, but does that mean that the country should follow her ideas? Non-Violent means can be effective for smaller things such as getting laws passed/rejected, but usually its methods aren't enough to overthrow a government. Many non-violent rebel groups end up being violent after their protests come to nothing. The only example I can think of when a non-violent group came to overthrow the current government was in India. But we must examine and understand the many differences between the Junta and the British controlling India. Mainly that the English government did not lose its power in England by letting India go. Britain was a colonial power, it sought economic advantages from its colonies (especially India). When India no longer became economically profitable and too difficult to manage, the English let it go. The Junta don't have the option of retaining their power if they let the protests succeed. Therefore (this might be opinion), using brutal methods may seem logical to keeping their power intact. In some sense, they have nothing to lose by stopping these protests by any means necessary. The problem is that all the guerrilla groups have already been destroyed by the Junta, and that half of the population informs the Junta on any misbehavior. If possible I would recommend an attempt at a more centralized armed resistance using guerrilla tactics against the Junta. I don't know exactly where the guerrillas might get their weapons, but I have no doubt that they would be able to find some. Even if the guerrillas fail, at least the international community might have a little more interest in the conflict in Burma. In any case, the time for non-violent seems to have ended and failed.
Works Cited
Fuller, Thomas. "A Look At the Opposition in Myanmar." New York Times 07 Oct. 2007..
Fuller, Thomas. "U.N. Reports Detentions in Myanmar." New York Times 4 Oct. 2007..
Holusha, John. "Myanmar News." New York Times 25 Sept. 2007..
"Myanmar." Wikipedia. 09 Oct. 2007..
Tom Laichas
What hope remains?
With a conflict in Burma coming to a close (or so it looks), one has to stop to wonder why the oppressive military dictatorship remains in power. Can we lay blame somewhere? Should the U.N. have done more for Burma? These are all pertinent questions which may or may not have adequate answers. Will Burma ever have independence from the Junta?
The Mon people were the first to arrive in Burma, and are suspected of having ruled Burma by the mid 900s. They were some of the first people to embrace Theravada Buddhism. Then the Tibeto-Burman Pyu arrived in the 1st century B.C. They created city states and traded actively with the Mon Kingdom. As the Pyu Kingdom fell apart in about 1044, another group who caled the Burman, or the Bamar, created their own Kingdom. King Anawrahta captured the Mon Kingdom and most of what is known as present day Burma; this Kingdom came to be known as Bagan as the capital was Bagan. The Bagan Kingdom adopted Theravada Buddhism. In the 13th century, as Bagan's power slowly faded, the Mongols led by Kublai Kahn took over the northern segment of Bagan and sacked the capital city. The Mongols didn't stay long; which led the Tai-Shan people from Yunnan to take over and become a major player in South East Asian politics. The Tai-Shan broke up the original Bagan Kingdom into several sections: 1. The Burman Kingdom of Ava or Innwa in upper Burma. 2.The Mon Kingdom of Hanthawady Pegu or Bago in the South. 3.The Rakhine Kingdom in the west. 4. Several states in the east and north-east. Realize now that all these Kingdoms and states were still under Shan rulers. These Kingdoms warred a lot (especially the Ava and Bago), but Buddhism did flourish in all the nations. In 1540, the Burman Kingdom of Taungoo under Tabinshwehti, reinforced by the Ava, defeated the Bago in the South. Tabinshwehti's successor, King Bayinnaug conquered upper Burma, Manipur, Shan states, Chiang Mai, Ayutthaya, and Lan Xang; putting most of south-east Asia under his control. Bayinnaug's death basically led to the end of the Empire and the loss of most of this territory for much of Burma. Rakhine forces, aided by Portugese mercenaries, ended up invading the Kingdom's capital Bago and taking the most important seaport Thanlynin. The Portuguese mercenaries overthrew the Rakhine government in Burma and created their own government. The Burmese were able to retake their kingdom from the Portuguese in 1611, rebuild their country, and remained steadily strong. Until 1648 when the kingdom went on an 100 year decline. The Mon, aided by the French, successfully rebelled in 1740 and took South Burma. Eventually they took over North Burma as well. The Konbaung dynasty formed, and lasted until the British invasion in in 1852. The Konbaung took over Siam numerous times (though they were also thrown out numerous times), resisted invasion attempts by China multiple times, and conquered Rakhine. In 1819, the Burmese annexed a kingdom called Assam, which put their adjacent to British East India. In 1824 the British attacked Burma and ended up taking large amounts of East Burman territory. In 1852, the British faced a much weaker Burma and took over most of Southern Burman provinces. In 1885, alarmed by the French's taking of Laos, the British invaded North Burma. The British occupation of Burma was interrupted multiple times by small coups and revolts which continuously failed. In the 1940s, Aung San created the Burman Independence Army to attempt to free Burma from British Rule. In 1947, Aung San became the Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council, but was assassinated soon after. In 1948, Burma became an independent Democratic nation. In 1962, the Democratic nation was toppled by a military coup d'etat. The current military rulers are called the Junta and came to power in a rebellion in 1988.
In 1990, two years after the Junta came to power, a promised Democratic Parliamentary election was to take place. The National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of Aung San), won 392 out of the 485 seats contested.(Fuller). The National Union Party, the Junta, only won ten seats. The Junta immediately overturned the election and kept power for itself. Aun San Suu Kyi was put under house arrest and forced either to remain under house arrest or leave the country forever (she remains under house arrest to this day). Many ethnic guerilla groups formed and attempted to overthrow the government but the Junta swiftly and effectively crushed these groups (it continued to crush any groups which arose through the 90s and 2000s). The false election and violent methods of the Junta alarmed the International Community which assailed the Junta with criticism and at the same time asked that the Junta adhere to the election's results. The Junta in essence ignored this criticism and the effort made by the U.N. to legitimize the election. In June of 1993 the Junta promised to have a National Convention and write up a constitution. The National Convention does meet every once in a while, but there have been no signs of efforts to actually follow through with the promise of a constitution. On the 23 June, 1993, Burma entered the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The military government in 2006 changed the capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw (city of the kinds), basically a small city created for the top Junta officials. An oasis for the rich Junta leaders far from the poor civilians of Yangon.
Last August the Junta found itself facing Massive Protests after it raised the price of gas and diesel oil by 500% (wow that is pretty ridiculous). It did so in order to attempt to fill a budget deficit from an increase in civil servants' pay. This deficit may also have come from the 2006 move from Yangon to Naypyidaw. The Junta quickly crushed these early protests. On September 19th hundreds of Buddhist monks staged protests against the Junta. The Buddhist monks are a very strong legitimate power in Burma second only to the Junta. The Junta became increasingly strict resulting in: multiples injuries and deaths, many detainees, curfews, limitations on Internet access... The Junta not only reacted violently, but also performed late night raids on anybody who they considered dangerous to their regime. They arrested and detained hundreds of monks and civilians. Nobody is sure what happened to them, but supposedly quite a few have been set free (though many assume that many of them were murdered). The conflict seems to have ended for the time being and nobody can really say when the conflict will start up again.
We now must ask ourselves, who's left to fight against the Junta? The Junta have restricted education to limit the amount of student activism. Students have always been at the forefront of rebellion, and were at the forefront of the 1988 uprising. All political groups except that of the Junta's have been crushed. The most prominent leader of the opposing political group, Aung San Suu Kyi, remains under house arrest. Any new political leaders get killed or incarcerated (The Junta is not stupid enough to kill Aung San Suu Kyi). The Junta have nothing to fear from opposing political groups. The population has been completely frightened: when government cars roam around the streets late at night warning you that if you step out of line that you will be taken away, who can blame them. They also have no weapons, Burma has a very strict gun control policy (except for the military of course). Blunt objects versus guns usually turns out badly. Also half the population is part of an organization which is meat to spy on the general populace. People can't trust their neighbors anymore because they could be informers. The 1988 uprising also worked because government officials joined in the protests, but where are they now? As stated above they have just received a pay raise, in fact they are probably the most well off after people in the military. They risk much more then the civilians by getting involved in these political protests. Though, if they did get involved, it would cause severe internal damage to the Junta. The monks also play a key role in the opposition to the Junta. Being passive by nature, seeing monks out in the streets protesting has awakened the world to the problem in Myanmar. The monks also have a certain amount of respect from the people, this leads them to have a certain amount of power over the people's conscious. Any harm done to the monks could bring real social problems for the Junta. The Junta dealt with the monks using night raids and none-lethal capture methods. Though capturing monks still angered civilians, the Junta would have faced much deeper hatred and resentment had they openly attacked and/or killed monks in the street. Not many people actually saw these night raids so they couldn't truly understand what had gone on. At the same time by not using lethal force against the monks they have curbed the wrath of the people. According to Tom Laichas, the Junta opposition would have a good chance if the middle military officials got tired of what they were doing and revolted. This would either lead to a civil war or the forfeit and flee of the higher up military officials in the Junta. What would happen if the middle officers gained power? I have no idea. They might continue with the idea of a military dictatorship with a few changes. Ideally they would hand over the power to the people. However, it doesn't seem likely that the middle officials will rebel anytime soon.
The Junta have taken care of the situation in a pragmatic fashion. They have come to completely understand how the international community and system would react. Burma's neighboring countries do not want a civil war there because of the amount of refugees that would cross the border to their country. At the same time countries such as China and Russia do not want U.N. intervention because they have their own areas seeking independence. The U.N. did send a special envoy to Myanmar. But even Ban Ki-Moon admits that the mission was not a “success”. In fact all they really achieved was to give a “strong message” to the Junta about the violent crack down on the protests. If that message could have ever had any validity, it would have been before the protests ended. The Junta play the game: the U.N. idly sits by waiting for the Junta to get everything back in order before they go inspect. The leader of the Junta, Senior General Than Shwe kept the U.N. enoy leader, Ibrahim Gambari, waiting for three days before meeting with him. I don't see any kind of outrage at such a disrespectful act against the U.N. The Junta understands how powerless the U.N. and international law have become (I mean even the U.S. doesn't follow international law according to many experts), and therefore have no incentives to heed the U.N.'s warnings. The U.N. didn't intervene in Burma when the election of 1990 was reversed and a major crack down on political parties began, why would they intervene now?
At the same time how effective can we deem these non-violent protests? Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won the Novel-Peace Prize in 1991 for her non-violent acts, but does that mean that the country should follow her ideas? Non-Violent means can be effective for smaller things such as getting laws passed/rejected, but usually its methods aren't enough to overthrow a government. Many non-violent rebel groups end up being violent after their protests come to nothing. The only example I can think of when a non-violent group came to overthrow the current government was in India. But we must examine and understand the many differences between the Junta and the British controlling India. Mainly that the English government did not lose its power in England by letting India go. Britain was a colonial power, it sought economic advantages from its colonies (especially India). When India no longer became economically profitable and too difficult to manage, the English let it go. The Junta don't have the option of retaining their power if they let the protests succeed. Therefore (this might be opinion), using brutal methods may seem logical to keeping their power intact. In some sense, they have nothing to lose by stopping these protests by any means necessary. The problem is that all the guerrilla groups have already been destroyed by the Junta, and that half of the population informs the Junta on any misbehavior. If possible I would recommend an attempt at a more centralized armed resistance using guerrilla tactics against the Junta. I don't know exactly where the guerrillas might get their weapons, but I have no doubt that they would be able to find some. Even if the guerrillas fail, at least the international community might have a little more interest in the conflict in Burma. In any case, the time for non-violent seems to have ended and failed.
Works Cited
Fuller, Thomas. "A Look At the Opposition in Myanmar." New York Times 07 Oct. 2007.
Fuller, Thomas. "U.N. Reports Detentions in Myanmar." New York Times 4 Oct. 2007.
Holusha, John. "Myanmar News." New York Times 25 Sept. 2007.
"Myanmar." Wikipedia. 09 Oct. 2007.
Sunday, October 7, 2007
First Critical Analysis
Julien Benichou
September 13th, 2007
Tom Laichas
The Other Side of History
Constant Tension
We can break down the world into three levels of analysis: the individual, the state, and international systems. The individual rules over himself, and the state rules over the individual. However, international systems (though meant to) do not rule over states. The state still has a certain amount of sovereignty which the international systems cannot fully control (we can get into the debate that the state doesn't have full control over the individual in a democracy. However, though some may disagree with me, it is the Democratic state which allows for the individual to have the right to do what he wants). Of course the international systems have laws which affect everybody like the Geneva laws or the genocide laws. But the international system has no control of the choices of the autonomous state. This means that in essence our world is anarchic: we have no leviathan (overarching supreme power). With nobody in charge of all the states, that also means no moral code can be considered universal. Every state has its own morals, and that means that one state cannot interfere with another state (even though literally they could). Here we find ourselves at the root of the norm of none-intervention (the other root being not wanting to use the recourses required in intervention). States and international systems find themselves reluctant to interfere because of this norm. In Safe Area Gorazde, Joe Sacco takes on a very liberal view of the conflict. Not only does he present the history but he also presents in some ways his opinions on the conflict. Sacco, depicting horror story after horror story, blames NATO/U.N/U.S. for not intervening sooner and with more force, but at the same time gives no solution for the obvious tension which still exists and may explode if international troops leave.
Sacco doesn't understand the idea that morals change depending on the state. Crossroads' philosophy promotes a certain amount of individuality in its students. When a state has autonomy, it can also decide for itself what it wants. It doesn't have to listen to anybody else. My old school, Le Lycee Francais de Los Angeles, promoted uniformity. The founders of Crossroads might find this promotion of uniformity completely outrageous. In the Crossroads perspective: it hurts the students' future. Students at the Lycee believe uniformity helps them be more studious. Crossroads also outnumbers Lycee by about ten to one. Why shouldn't Crossroads simply take over the Lycee by sheer force of numbers and change its policies? It would be a simple and easy way to change their policies. The Lycee kids obviously have been misled by the evil administration at their school. Yet, right when Crossroads invades, they don't find the basketball court full of cheering Lycee students. Instead they find the Lycee students fighting with all their might to push Crossroads out. This example seems foolish and childish, but it still rings true to a certain extent. Crossroads just couldn't understand why Lycee kids would like uniformity, so they decided that the Lycee kids hadn't seen the light of individuality. At the same time lets mix it up a little bit. A minority of the Lycee students, 30% to be exact, hate uniformity and want individuality. This minority finds themselves oppressed by the 70% majority. The 30% revolted, and took over half the school. Once Crossroads intervened, it created an administration with half uniformal and half individual employees. With tensions still high, xrds decided to leave good ol' Roger Weaver to make sure everything stayed under control. Yet, once Roger Weaver retired, chaos broke out again. Both these situations show a Crossroads with strict moral ideas which it willingly pushes onto others who don't agree. Soon enough Liz would be in charge of Harvard Westlake, Morgan would be in charge of Brentwood, and we would hire a new guy to make sure New Roads didn't get any ideas. Being stretched so thin, all the schools revolt against Crossroads. They don't believe in our morals, and who can blame them? How can we ever know if we've stumbled upon the correct morals? Better yet: can there be universal morals? Sacco seems to believe so. But who, as Americans, are we to tell who's wrong and who's right. With the fall of the Soviet Union, we've shift from a Bipolar world, to a Unipolar world. That means that the “bad guys” can be harder to spot. During the cold war choosing sides became easy: whoever fought against the Soviets would automatically become the allies of the U.S. and vice versa. Now the U.S. and the allies have no superpower to focus on. The U.S. cannot just look at which sides doesn't want Communism anymore. This has left the United States crippled to a certain extent on the international scene. We've lost our reasoning to intervene in countries. It probably wouldn't threaten U.S. security if South Africa decided to go Fascist. In some sense, the fall of the Soviet Union has left countries more free to choose their own path. It took a while for NATO and the U.N. to intervene because they couldn't take sides. We already know that the U.N. denied or overlooked claims that Genocide was occurring with the statements of Lieutenant Rose, “The situation was a lot better than I had been led to believe...the town had not been destroyed to the level which I expected. “ (Sacco 187) “Later, an unidentified Senior U.N. military officer—who was later identified as Lt. General Rose---claims that Gorazde's casualties had been inflated 'in order to shame the world into doing something'” (Sacco 187) This meant that the U.N. could only enter in order to create safe zones. “the U.N. top military commander in Bosnia the battle for Gorazde had endangered his peace keepers and brought the U.N. perilously close to taking sides in the war.” (Sacco 186) The U.N. couldn't take sides in the war because that meant that they considered their morals or beliefs of more importance their others'. The U.N. had to keep a certain amount of impartiality until one side committed genocide, broke with the Geneva convention, or attacked U.N. peace keeping troops. The U.N. didn't come to Bosnia to fight the Serbs (as many Bosnians thought was the case), they came to protect civilians. The U.N. couldn't fight the war for the Bosniaks, that just wouldn't be right. Until NATO came and started bombing Serb forces, the U.N. focused mainly on bringing supplies and help to those who needed it. The U.N. focused on things like the Blue Road, “Why did NATO armies, readied through the same decades to launch a thermonuclear war on a moment's notice, find it inconvenient to face down a flimsy roadblock manned by a rabble of drunken racists?” (Hitchens) They didn't find it inconvenient, the Blue Road opened because the Serbs let it open. (it was surrounded by Serb territory) At any moments notice the Serb army could have taken it over, with NATO troops completely overwhelmed. Why should the U.N./NATO have the right to say that the Serb's cause was unjust? “They're not all Chetniks, there are good people there, too” (Sacco 161) Even in the U.S. constitution it says we have the right to revolt if we feel compelled to.
How long will NATO/U.N. peace forces stay in Bosnia? Will a window for leaving ever appear? Sacco never answers the question, and I think he doesn't know the answer. Edin gave his opinion on the matter, “If this war was over, and he wasn't sure it was, then there'd be another war within 50 years, he said” (Sacco 227) Edin's view basically shows that the Dayton Accords can only impede the inevitable fate of another war. The problem lies with the actual ethnic problem, in the chapter titled “Can you live with the Serbs again?” Most answers fell along the lines of, “The Serbs can't be trusted, they lie” (Sacco 160) or “generally I don't want to see the people who've done this for another 20 or 40 years.” (Sacco 161) Sacco criticizes the U.N. and NATO for doing nothing, but what could they do that would stop the war? Even the Dayton Accords seem like a temporary peace for Bosnia. International forces understood that getting involved in the conflict could really do nothing. U.N. and NATO forces can stop the fighting, but they can never relieve the tensions. No outside force can do that, Bosnia has to figure out its own problems. I'll give an example using an Act Utilitarian perspective. Let's go back to 1992 when the war just began. The U.N. has to look at the consequences of its entering. If the U.N. enters now and stops the war, will the amount of civilians they save now, make up for the amount that will die if war breaks out later because the conflict hadn't resolved itself (which seems probable). If the conflict looks like it will start up again if international peace keepers leave the country, how long can we or should we control their affairs? How long can we expend our resources for a country which seems ready to revert to civil war? Sacco can criticize all he wants, but the Bosnians had to figure out their own problems, the U.N. couldn't force anything because that wouldn't achieve anything permanent. I understand why the U.N. felt reluctant to enter Bosnia and feel that waiting a few years to end the war, may have helped Bosnia's chances of not reverting to a civil war.
September 13th, 2007
Tom Laichas
The Other Side of History
Constant Tension
We can break down the world into three levels of analysis: the individual, the state, and international systems. The individual rules over himself, and the state rules over the individual. However, international systems (though meant to) do not rule over states. The state still has a certain amount of sovereignty which the international systems cannot fully control (we can get into the debate that the state doesn't have full control over the individual in a democracy. However, though some may disagree with me, it is the Democratic state which allows for the individual to have the right to do what he wants). Of course the international systems have laws which affect everybody like the Geneva laws or the genocide laws. But the international system has no control of the choices of the autonomous state. This means that in essence our world is anarchic: we have no leviathan (overarching supreme power). With nobody in charge of all the states, that also means no moral code can be considered universal. Every state has its own morals, and that means that one state cannot interfere with another state (even though literally they could). Here we find ourselves at the root of the norm of none-intervention (the other root being not wanting to use the recourses required in intervention). States and international systems find themselves reluctant to interfere because of this norm. In Safe Area Gorazde, Joe Sacco takes on a very liberal view of the conflict. Not only does he present the history but he also presents in some ways his opinions on the conflict. Sacco, depicting horror story after horror story, blames NATO/U.N/U.S. for not intervening sooner and with more force, but at the same time gives no solution for the obvious tension which still exists and may explode if international troops leave.
Sacco doesn't understand the idea that morals change depending on the state. Crossroads' philosophy promotes a certain amount of individuality in its students. When a state has autonomy, it can also decide for itself what it wants. It doesn't have to listen to anybody else. My old school, Le Lycee Francais de Los Angeles, promoted uniformity. The founders of Crossroads might find this promotion of uniformity completely outrageous. In the Crossroads perspective: it hurts the students' future. Students at the Lycee believe uniformity helps them be more studious. Crossroads also outnumbers Lycee by about ten to one. Why shouldn't Crossroads simply take over the Lycee by sheer force of numbers and change its policies? It would be a simple and easy way to change their policies. The Lycee kids obviously have been misled by the evil administration at their school. Yet, right when Crossroads invades, they don't find the basketball court full of cheering Lycee students. Instead they find the Lycee students fighting with all their might to push Crossroads out. This example seems foolish and childish, but it still rings true to a certain extent. Crossroads just couldn't understand why Lycee kids would like uniformity, so they decided that the Lycee kids hadn't seen the light of individuality. At the same time lets mix it up a little bit. A minority of the Lycee students, 30% to be exact, hate uniformity and want individuality. This minority finds themselves oppressed by the 70% majority. The 30% revolted, and took over half the school. Once Crossroads intervened, it created an administration with half uniformal and half individual employees. With tensions still high, xrds decided to leave good ol' Roger Weaver to make sure everything stayed under control. Yet, once Roger Weaver retired, chaos broke out again. Both these situations show a Crossroads with strict moral ideas which it willingly pushes onto others who don't agree. Soon enough Liz would be in charge of Harvard Westlake, Morgan would be in charge of Brentwood, and we would hire a new guy to make sure New Roads didn't get any ideas. Being stretched so thin, all the schools revolt against Crossroads. They don't believe in our morals, and who can blame them? How can we ever know if we've stumbled upon the correct morals? Better yet: can there be universal morals? Sacco seems to believe so. But who, as Americans, are we to tell who's wrong and who's right. With the fall of the Soviet Union, we've shift from a Bipolar world, to a Unipolar world. That means that the “bad guys” can be harder to spot. During the cold war choosing sides became easy: whoever fought against the Soviets would automatically become the allies of the U.S. and vice versa. Now the U.S. and the allies have no superpower to focus on. The U.S. cannot just look at which sides doesn't want Communism anymore. This has left the United States crippled to a certain extent on the international scene. We've lost our reasoning to intervene in countries. It probably wouldn't threaten U.S. security if South Africa decided to go Fascist. In some sense, the fall of the Soviet Union has left countries more free to choose their own path. It took a while for NATO and the U.N. to intervene because they couldn't take sides. We already know that the U.N. denied or overlooked claims that Genocide was occurring with the statements of Lieutenant Rose, “The situation was a lot better than I had been led to believe...the town had not been destroyed to the level which I expected. “ (Sacco 187) “Later, an unidentified Senior U.N. military officer—who was later identified as Lt. General Rose---claims that Gorazde's casualties had been inflated 'in order to shame the world into doing something'” (Sacco 187) This meant that the U.N. could only enter in order to create safe zones. “the U.N. top military commander in Bosnia the battle for Gorazde had endangered his peace keepers and brought the U.N. perilously close to taking sides in the war.” (Sacco 186) The U.N. couldn't take sides in the war because that meant that they considered their morals or beliefs of more importance their others'. The U.N. had to keep a certain amount of impartiality until one side committed genocide, broke with the Geneva convention, or attacked U.N. peace keeping troops. The U.N. didn't come to Bosnia to fight the Serbs (as many Bosnians thought was the case), they came to protect civilians. The U.N. couldn't fight the war for the Bosniaks, that just wouldn't be right. Until NATO came and started bombing Serb forces, the U.N. focused mainly on bringing supplies and help to those who needed it. The U.N. focused on things like the Blue Road, “Why did NATO armies, readied through the same decades to launch a thermonuclear war on a moment's notice, find it inconvenient to face down a flimsy roadblock manned by a rabble of drunken racists?” (Hitchens) They didn't find it inconvenient, the Blue Road opened because the Serbs let it open. (it was surrounded by Serb territory) At any moments notice the Serb army could have taken it over, with NATO troops completely overwhelmed. Why should the U.N./NATO have the right to say that the Serb's cause was unjust? “They're not all Chetniks, there are good people there, too” (Sacco 161) Even in the U.S. constitution it says we have the right to revolt if we feel compelled to.
How long will NATO/U.N. peace forces stay in Bosnia? Will a window for leaving ever appear? Sacco never answers the question, and I think he doesn't know the answer. Edin gave his opinion on the matter, “If this war was over, and he wasn't sure it was, then there'd be another war within 50 years, he said” (Sacco 227) Edin's view basically shows that the Dayton Accords can only impede the inevitable fate of another war. The problem lies with the actual ethnic problem, in the chapter titled “Can you live with the Serbs again?” Most answers fell along the lines of, “The Serbs can't be trusted, they lie” (Sacco 160) or “generally I don't want to see the people who've done this for another 20 or 40 years.” (Sacco 161) Sacco criticizes the U.N. and NATO for doing nothing, but what could they do that would stop the war? Even the Dayton Accords seem like a temporary peace for Bosnia. International forces understood that getting involved in the conflict could really do nothing. U.N. and NATO forces can stop the fighting, but they can never relieve the tensions. No outside force can do that, Bosnia has to figure out its own problems. I'll give an example using an Act Utilitarian perspective. Let's go back to 1992 when the war just began. The U.N. has to look at the consequences of its entering. If the U.N. enters now and stops the war, will the amount of civilians they save now, make up for the amount that will die if war breaks out later because the conflict hadn't resolved itself (which seems probable). If the conflict looks like it will start up again if international peace keepers leave the country, how long can we or should we control their affairs? How long can we expend our resources for a country which seems ready to revert to civil war? Sacco can criticize all he wants, but the Bosnians had to figure out their own problems, the U.N. couldn't force anything because that wouldn't achieve anything permanent. I understand why the U.N. felt reluctant to enter Bosnia and feel that waiting a few years to end the war, may have helped Bosnia's chances of not reverting to a civil war.
Curtin Chapter 6
Precis Curtin Chapter 6
Curtin in this chapter really focuses on administrations and their choices. He asks how these choices affected the administrations' situations in their colonies. He also asks how the European colonial governments created social consequences in the countries they controlled. He begins by stating how policy making about colonies was all good, but actually seeing it done in those colonies was a completely different matter. He then talks about how political and diplomatic history are usually more studies then administrative history. This being because there is always a sense of a game with players who make smart moves, bad moves, inefficient moves. And, of course, there are winners and losers. The new administrations were trying to gain a more centralized and efficient bureaucracy. The growth of administrative technology and organization paralleled the growth of industrial technology which allowed for much greater growth then if industrial technology had arrived on its own. European companies at first just created trade empires and trade diasporas. By the later half of the 1700s, the companies found themselves taking over territory and Asia and facing the same administrative problems as everyone else. These companies had taken over these other areas militarily, but they recognized the legitimacy of the local governors and did not want to disturb that balance. European governments were becoming totalitarian at the time, but Europeans did not have enough personnel overseas to form a totalitarian government, which meant that they had to use the local rulers in order to find any success and quell some tensions some might have had about being ruled by foreigners. Hence a system of dualism arose: both the European power and the natural rulers governed the colonial state. Advocates of dualism stated that because of racial and cultural differences, governments which worked in Europe may not work in Europe's colonies. Curtin then gives examples of European colonies under the influence of Dualism in South and Southeast Asia. He begins with Bengal. The British East India Company(BEIC) played the role of diwan of Bengal under the Mughal Empire. The BEIC used this subordinate role to mask its rise to power. In essence, “it was still a commercial firm with political and military functions on the side.”(Curtin 96) The Mughal Empire made most of its money off of revenue paid for working on the land. This meant that the Mughal Empire actually owned the land, not just had soverign control over it. The Mughals had a subordinate class called the Zamindari who collected revenue. This meant that Bengal was a very agrarian economy where the land was owned by the state, but the Zamindari controlled the land itself. The state wasn't collecting taxes or rent, it wasn't really sure what they were collecting. The BEIC, modeling off of the British system, gave the land to the Zamindari, who were responsible for paying land revenue. What ended up happening was that the original Zamindari could not pay the original high land revenue prices (the BEIC lowered these later), and had to sell the land to wealthy people outside of Bengal. The BEIC's system changed the Zamindari from being part of the local government, to rent collectors. The point Curtin tries to make with this example of Bengal, is that any new revenue policy would have drastic effects on the state in question. The central Asian state was very similar to Bengal. Under Muslim law, all land was the property of the ruler. But in general the local aristocrats and some Muslim charitable foundations actually ruled over the land. Russia declared that all the land stilled belonged to the state, but being skeptical of the aristocracy, had the people that worked the land rule over it. The only local rulers that the Russians kept were the village officials. This might seem like a revolutionary idea, but it was really meant to increase land revenue. This led to the impoverishment of the local aristocrats. When the Soviets came to power they created large collective farms. The number of settlers to Central asia allowed for there to be grassroots managers. With the local elites gone, the Soviets attempted to create a new elite class by Soviet standards. Those elites had no loyalty to the Soviets and when the Soviet Union collapsed, declared independence for their countries. The VOC in Java was an example of a different kind of administrative choice. The Bupati ruled thought a subordinate class called the priyayi. When the VOC originally arrived, they had no intention of taking over Java, but they did take Jakarta as their naval base. When the VOC took over, they recognized the Javanese leaders and called them regents. The VOC made sure that the regents controlled the peasants and told them what to produce for the European market (like coffee). When the VOC collapsed the Dutch government took over and assigned land to European planters. The Dutch were trying to create a powerful central bureaucratic government in Java. The Dutch felt the most danger from the village level religious leaders and from the western-education nationalists. In Malaya, the Siamese had the most influence. However, at the same time the Malay were ruled by various sultans. Malaya became a British protectorate where each sultan had to ask the British residents for advice. Eventually the sultans came together to the form the Malayan state The Malay had the problem of Chinese immigration and economic growth based on tin and plantations. The Malay decided to try and make a westernized government administration theoretically under the sultans, but in reality under the British residents' control. The British residents brought in British law, British officials... The sultans basically became constitutional monarchs who would only deal with culture and religion. The British needed these sultans more as representatives then as useful tools. This eventually led for the sultans to have no power, which meant that the nationalists in 1957 were the leaders leading the revolt against the British. However the sultans did not disappear, they were “kept on as a kind of corporate constitutional monarchy.”(Curtin 106)
Curtin in this chapter really focuses on administrations and their choices. He asks how these choices affected the administrations' situations in their colonies. He also asks how the European colonial governments created social consequences in the countries they controlled. He begins by stating how policy making about colonies was all good, but actually seeing it done in those colonies was a completely different matter. He then talks about how political and diplomatic history are usually more studies then administrative history. This being because there is always a sense of a game with players who make smart moves, bad moves, inefficient moves. And, of course, there are winners and losers. The new administrations were trying to gain a more centralized and efficient bureaucracy. The growth of administrative technology and organization paralleled the growth of industrial technology which allowed for much greater growth then if industrial technology had arrived on its own. European companies at first just created trade empires and trade diasporas. By the later half of the 1700s, the companies found themselves taking over territory and Asia and facing the same administrative problems as everyone else. These companies had taken over these other areas militarily, but they recognized the legitimacy of the local governors and did not want to disturb that balance. European governments were becoming totalitarian at the time, but Europeans did not have enough personnel overseas to form a totalitarian government, which meant that they had to use the local rulers in order to find any success and quell some tensions some might have had about being ruled by foreigners. Hence a system of dualism arose: both the European power and the natural rulers governed the colonial state. Advocates of dualism stated that because of racial and cultural differences, governments which worked in Europe may not work in Europe's colonies. Curtin then gives examples of European colonies under the influence of Dualism in South and Southeast Asia. He begins with Bengal. The British East India Company(BEIC) played the role of diwan of Bengal under the Mughal Empire. The BEIC used this subordinate role to mask its rise to power. In essence, “it was still a commercial firm with political and military functions on the side.”(Curtin 96) The Mughal Empire made most of its money off of revenue paid for working on the land. This meant that the Mughal Empire actually owned the land, not just had soverign control over it. The Mughals had a subordinate class called the Zamindari who collected revenue. This meant that Bengal was a very agrarian economy where the land was owned by the state, but the Zamindari controlled the land itself. The state wasn't collecting taxes or rent, it wasn't really sure what they were collecting. The BEIC, modeling off of the British system, gave the land to the Zamindari, who were responsible for paying land revenue. What ended up happening was that the original Zamindari could not pay the original high land revenue prices (the BEIC lowered these later), and had to sell the land to wealthy people outside of Bengal. The BEIC's system changed the Zamindari from being part of the local government, to rent collectors. The point Curtin tries to make with this example of Bengal, is that any new revenue policy would have drastic effects on the state in question. The central Asian state was very similar to Bengal. Under Muslim law, all land was the property of the ruler. But in general the local aristocrats and some Muslim charitable foundations actually ruled over the land. Russia declared that all the land stilled belonged to the state, but being skeptical of the aristocracy, had the people that worked the land rule over it. The only local rulers that the Russians kept were the village officials. This might seem like a revolutionary idea, but it was really meant to increase land revenue. This led to the impoverishment of the local aristocrats. When the Soviets came to power they created large collective farms. The number of settlers to Central asia allowed for there to be grassroots managers. With the local elites gone, the Soviets attempted to create a new elite class by Soviet standards. Those elites had no loyalty to the Soviets and when the Soviet Union collapsed, declared independence for their countries. The VOC in Java was an example of a different kind of administrative choice. The Bupati ruled thought a subordinate class called the priyayi. When the VOC originally arrived, they had no intention of taking over Java, but they did take Jakarta as their naval base. When the VOC took over, they recognized the Javanese leaders and called them regents. The VOC made sure that the regents controlled the peasants and told them what to produce for the European market (like coffee). When the VOC collapsed the Dutch government took over and assigned land to European planters. The Dutch were trying to create a powerful central bureaucratic government in Java. The Dutch felt the most danger from the village level religious leaders and from the western-education nationalists. In Malaya, the Siamese had the most influence. However, at the same time the Malay were ruled by various sultans. Malaya became a British protectorate where each sultan had to ask the British residents for advice. Eventually the sultans came together to the form the Malayan state The Malay had the problem of Chinese immigration and economic growth based on tin and plantations. The Malay decided to try and make a westernized government administration theoretically under the sultans, but in reality under the British residents' control. The British residents brought in British law, British officials... The sultans basically became constitutional monarchs who would only deal with culture and religion. The British needed these sultans more as representatives then as useful tools. This eventually led for the sultans to have no power, which meant that the nationalists in 1957 were the leaders leading the revolt against the British. However the sultans did not disappear, they were “kept on as a kind of corporate constitutional monarchy.”(Curtin 106)
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
Modern Imperialism
Modern Imperialism
Philip Curtin made some very good arguments about European industrialization and imperialism. In general I agree with most of his theories. However, it seems as though Curtin seems to think that imperialism ended in the mid/late 20th century. He's half correct: European military imperialism has ended. The top nations in the world no longer “colonize” (as Curtin considers this the wrong word) nations and create local governments. He fails to realize that a new form of imperialism has arisen: economic imperialism. Countries have given up their ideas of expansion for the security of their markets. During military imperialism, countries also sought to expand their markets, but used a different method. By imposing sovereignty over another nation they gained control of their markets. That ship has sailed; countries now control markets through investments. The costs of controlling another country have risen too high, it has lost all of its profit. The most powerful states have given up their somewhat obvious military control of other countries for the more subtle economic control of countries.
Military imperialism had become too expensive and culturally impossible to continue. There have been many technological advances since the 19th century. The advanced nations now have planes that fly three times the speed of sound, a bomb that can do massive damage, extremely well trained troops armed with the newest technologies, and a communications system which has become instantaneous. What stops countries like the U.S. from taking over other 3rd world growth oriented countries which do not have economies half as big? I see two reasons: the rise of nationalism/ideas of autonomy in poor countries during the 20th century, and the military problems which lead to economic problems by doing so. Imperialist nations of the past mostly used local governments and local armies to control their colonies, “By the late 1800s, the vast majority of the troops serving in the French, British, German, and Netherlands armies overseas were non-European and the cost of maintaining those armies fell to the local budget.” (Curtin 33) The rising nationalist movement in many countries (Serbia, China, North Korea, Iran...) makes ruling over them much more difficult, “Nationalism, in the sense of opposition to European rule, has been endemic in the colonial world from the late 1800s. Nationalism in the other sense of loyalty to people with shared language and customs can be expected to thrive where different culture are present in the same society.” (Curtin 69) The idea of one's own culture having its own autonomous nation has spread rapidly across the globe. This can be seen when areas like Kosovo, Tibet, Aceh all fight against the powers that rule over them. These countries claim their own individual culture and therefore want autonomy from rule by other cultures. This means that if a developed nation were to take over a country and create a local government, they would constantly face guerrilla wars. Now, if the developed nation decided to take central control of the country instead (maybe the thought process might involve the fact that developed nations now have faster communications and transports then before therefore there may be no need for local rulers), it would be its responsibility to fight that guerrilla war. As seen in Vietnam, an organized army has a lot of trouble fighting against guerrilla tactics, “The military lesson that emerged later in the twentieth century was that an offensive war against people with equal arms requires at least equal arms, but to defeat guerrillas armed with modern weapons requires a force that outnumber the guerrillas many times over.” (Curtin 31). With explosives so easy to make (and probably to purchase) and guns like the AK47 easy to attain, even in the poorest countries, guerrillas can find the firepower necessary to wage a war against a developed nation. This leads me to my second point: these increased military needs for keeping a nation under control also increase the amount of money needed to spend on these wars. Take the Iraq war as an example: the U.S. government has to pay the large fees of keeping its forces in Iraq, maintaining equipment, giving relief to citizens badly effected by the war, reconstruction of the Iraq economy and government, and the financial support for an Iraqi government created by the U.S.... The original 50 billion dollar tab for the operation has been completely blow out of the water. Estimates for how much the war will cost have around 320 billion. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/26/AR2006042 601601.html, Jonathan Weisman) Though the U.S. says it may pull out soon, who knows how much money this war will actually cost the U.S. governmet by the end. Aside from the actual money that the U.S. has payed, 1.1 million Iraqis have been displaced since the beginning of the war.(http://www.economist.com/research/articl esBySubject/ displaystory.cfm?subjectid=348966&story_id=9783288) This means that surrounding countries have received a huge influx of refugees. Such large displacement into other countries can cause major economic damage. This can also cause a lot of tension between the refugees and the locals who suffer because of the sudden increase in population. (Tom Laichas, you said this in class) This effects the U.S. and other developed nations in a more round about way. If the developed nations have any sort of trade going with the countries receiving the bulk of the refugees (which I'm guessing they do), the price of goods from that country will rise. It's simple: if more people have entered the country (especially illegally so they don't have to pay taxes) the government has to spend more money. This means their price for goods has to rise in order to help make up for the difference. Here again the developed nations lose money. If a conflict were to develop between the locals (who are fed up with the refugees, and probably might encourage a nationalist movement) and the refugees, again the west would suffer economically: but more on that in the paragraph.
An eternal goal has become accentuated in the last few years: grow economically as much and as fast as possible. The war has switched, developed nations no longer fight with arms but with investments. The new competitive economic drive of countries has created a new dislike for war, “It is in the conflict of opposed forces that science seeks order and equilibrium: perpetual war, according to it, is the sole means of obtaining peace; that war is called competition.” (Marx 33) As stated above, war can be very unprofitable. The exceptions to those rules can only be found in total war (like what World War 2 did to the U.S. economy). The only time the U.S. went to war with a country after World War 2 (Vietnam, Korea...), though they stated a humanitarian reason for doing so, I see a different reason. If countries like South Korea and Vietnam became communist, the U.S. might have issues with trade in a communist country (because of the Soviets at the time). This meant that they were willing to give up some money now for the prospect of trade later. The Marshall Plan also exemplified this. Communist threats started arising in countries like France and Greece, so the U.S. flowed money in to stop them. In Utilitarian terms, losing 1 billion now has utility if you make 5 billion off of it. However, its not just developed nations which do not want war. Countries like China,Vietnam...all have found their place in the world selling good to developed nations (and paving the path for them to become a developed nation). A new slogan for the world has popped up: “Make money; not war!” (Crossette) What does that mean for developed nations? They have now created international organizations under the pretext of stopping future wars (the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization). This also means that these developed nations have found a new way to control less developed nations through economic investments. Multinational Corporations (usually based in a developed nation), once deemed evil by foreign countries, have come to embrace them with open arms. Countries like China, Vietnam, South Korea all sell their goods to developed nations. This makes China completely dependent on 1st world purchases. Take Japan in Singapore as an example: it has changed its slogan from “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” to “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations”. “There are differences, of course [in Singapore]...They wear business suits instead of uniforms. They carry attache cases in stead of guns. Also, they are welcome.” (Beech) A Marxist theory states how the laborer depends more on the capitalist then the capitalist on the worker. The root of this lies in the fact that the capitalist has more money and options if something goes wrong with the workers. If something goes wrong for the capitalists the workers fall much worse. I like to think of this perspective in terms of poor states (the workers) and the rich states (the capitalists). If the world ran out of oil tomorrow the richer nations would have more of a chance to be able to fall on their feet. The richer nations would lose more money, but that would affect them less then it would affect poorer nations. The poorer nations would look to the richer nations for aid aid find nothing. By realist perspective, this huge and sudden gap in power would trigger huge tensions between the rich and poor countries. Then the search for peace could be broken by wars of power.
Works Cited
Beech, Keyes. "Japan Trade Empire Rises in Southeast." Los Angeles Times 13 Dec. 1981. ProQuest.
Crossette, Barbara. "A New Credo: Make Money; Not War." New York Times 24 Aug. 1997. ProQuest.
Curtin, Philip D. The World & the West. New York: Cambridge UP, 2000.
Kristof, Nicholas D. "Curbs Give Way to Welcome for Multinational Companies." New York Times 11 May 1985. ProQuest.
"The Toll of War." The Economist..
Philip Curtin made some very good arguments about European industrialization and imperialism. In general I agree with most of his theories. However, it seems as though Curtin seems to think that imperialism ended in the mid/late 20th century. He's half correct: European military imperialism has ended. The top nations in the world no longer “colonize” (as Curtin considers this the wrong word) nations and create local governments. He fails to realize that a new form of imperialism has arisen: economic imperialism. Countries have given up their ideas of expansion for the security of their markets. During military imperialism, countries also sought to expand their markets, but used a different method. By imposing sovereignty over another nation they gained control of their markets. That ship has sailed; countries now control markets through investments. The costs of controlling another country have risen too high, it has lost all of its profit. The most powerful states have given up their somewhat obvious military control of other countries for the more subtle economic control of countries.
Military imperialism had become too expensive and culturally impossible to continue. There have been many technological advances since the 19th century. The advanced nations now have planes that fly three times the speed of sound, a bomb that can do massive damage, extremely well trained troops armed with the newest technologies, and a communications system which has become instantaneous. What stops countries like the U.S. from taking over other 3rd world growth oriented countries which do not have economies half as big? I see two reasons: the rise of nationalism/ideas of autonomy in poor countries during the 20th century, and the military problems which lead to economic problems by doing so. Imperialist nations of the past mostly used local governments and local armies to control their colonies, “By the late 1800s, the vast majority of the troops serving in the French, British, German, and Netherlands armies overseas were non-European and the cost of maintaining those armies fell to the local budget.” (Curtin 33) The rising nationalist movement in many countries (Serbia, China, North Korea, Iran...) makes ruling over them much more difficult, “Nationalism, in the sense of opposition to European rule, has been endemic in the colonial world from the late 1800s. Nationalism in the other sense of loyalty to people with shared language and customs can be expected to thrive where different culture are present in the same society.” (Curtin 69) The idea of one's own culture having its own autonomous nation has spread rapidly across the globe. This can be seen when areas like Kosovo, Tibet, Aceh all fight against the powers that rule over them. These countries claim their own individual culture and therefore want autonomy from rule by other cultures. This means that if a developed nation were to take over a country and create a local government, they would constantly face guerrilla wars. Now, if the developed nation decided to take central control of the country instead (maybe the thought process might involve the fact that developed nations now have faster communications and transports then before therefore there may be no need for local rulers), it would be its responsibility to fight that guerrilla war. As seen in Vietnam, an organized army has a lot of trouble fighting against guerrilla tactics, “The military lesson that emerged later in the twentieth century was that an offensive war against people with equal arms requires at least equal arms, but to defeat guerrillas armed with modern weapons requires a force that outnumber the guerrillas many times over.” (Curtin 31). With explosives so easy to make (and probably to purchase) and guns like the AK47 easy to attain, even in the poorest countries, guerrillas can find the firepower necessary to wage a war against a developed nation. This leads me to my second point: these increased military needs for keeping a nation under control also increase the amount of money needed to spend on these wars. Take the Iraq war as an example: the U.S. government has to pay the large fees of keeping its forces in Iraq, maintaining equipment, giving relief to citizens badly effected by the war, reconstruction of the Iraq economy and government, and the financial support for an Iraqi government created by the U.S.... The original 50 billion dollar tab for the operation has been completely blow out of the water. Estimates for how much the war will cost have around 320 billion. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/26/AR2006042 601601.html, Jonathan Weisman) Though the U.S. says it may pull out soon, who knows how much money this war will actually cost the U.S. governmet by the end. Aside from the actual money that the U.S. has payed, 1.1 million Iraqis have been displaced since the beginning of the war.(http://www.economist.com/research/articl esBySubject/ displaystory.cfm?subjectid=348966&story_id=9783288) This means that surrounding countries have received a huge influx of refugees. Such large displacement into other countries can cause major economic damage. This can also cause a lot of tension between the refugees and the locals who suffer because of the sudden increase in population. (Tom Laichas, you said this in class) This effects the U.S. and other developed nations in a more round about way. If the developed nations have any sort of trade going with the countries receiving the bulk of the refugees (which I'm guessing they do), the price of goods from that country will rise. It's simple: if more people have entered the country (especially illegally so they don't have to pay taxes) the government has to spend more money. This means their price for goods has to rise in order to help make up for the difference. Here again the developed nations lose money. If a conflict were to develop between the locals (who are fed up with the refugees, and probably might encourage a nationalist movement) and the refugees, again the west would suffer economically: but more on that in the paragraph.
An eternal goal has become accentuated in the last few years: grow economically as much and as fast as possible. The war has switched, developed nations no longer fight with arms but with investments. The new competitive economic drive of countries has created a new dislike for war, “It is in the conflict of opposed forces that science seeks order and equilibrium: perpetual war, according to it, is the sole means of obtaining peace; that war is called competition.” (Marx 33) As stated above, war can be very unprofitable. The exceptions to those rules can only be found in total war (like what World War 2 did to the U.S. economy). The only time the U.S. went to war with a country after World War 2 (Vietnam, Korea...), though they stated a humanitarian reason for doing so, I see a different reason. If countries like South Korea and Vietnam became communist, the U.S. might have issues with trade in a communist country (because of the Soviets at the time). This meant that they were willing to give up some money now for the prospect of trade later. The Marshall Plan also exemplified this. Communist threats started arising in countries like France and Greece, so the U.S. flowed money in to stop them. In Utilitarian terms, losing 1 billion now has utility if you make 5 billion off of it. However, its not just developed nations which do not want war. Countries like China,Vietnam...all have found their place in the world selling good to developed nations (and paving the path for them to become a developed nation). A new slogan for the world has popped up: “Make money; not war!” (Crossette) What does that mean for developed nations? They have now created international organizations under the pretext of stopping future wars (the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization). This also means that these developed nations have found a new way to control less developed nations through economic investments. Multinational Corporations (usually based in a developed nation), once deemed evil by foreign countries, have come to embrace them with open arms. Countries like China, Vietnam, South Korea all sell their goods to developed nations. This makes China completely dependent on 1st world purchases. Take Japan in Singapore as an example: it has changed its slogan from “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” to “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations”. “There are differences, of course [in Singapore]...They wear business suits instead of uniforms. They carry attache cases in stead of guns. Also, they are welcome.” (Beech) A Marxist theory states how the laborer depends more on the capitalist then the capitalist on the worker. The root of this lies in the fact that the capitalist has more money and options if something goes wrong with the workers. If something goes wrong for the capitalists the workers fall much worse. I like to think of this perspective in terms of poor states (the workers) and the rich states (the capitalists). If the world ran out of oil tomorrow the richer nations would have more of a chance to be able to fall on their feet. The richer nations would lose more money, but that would affect them less then it would affect poorer nations. The poorer nations would look to the richer nations for aid aid find nothing. By realist perspective, this huge and sudden gap in power would trigger huge tensions between the rich and poor countries. Then the search for peace could be broken by wars of power.
Works Cited
Beech, Keyes. "Japan Trade Empire Rises in Southeast." Los Angeles Times 13 Dec. 1981. ProQuest.
Crossette, Barbara. "A New Credo: Make Money; Not War." New York Times 24 Aug. 1997. ProQuest.
Curtin, Philip D. The World & the West. New York: Cambridge UP, 2000.
Kristof, Nicholas D. "Curbs Give Way to Welcome for Multinational Companies." New York Times 11 May 1985. ProQuest.
"The Toll of War." The Economist.
Monday, October 1, 2007
Curtin Chapter 5
Curtin asks in chapter 5 how integrated plural societies came to be. He focuses on Mexico and the integration of Spanish culture there. The conquest of the Americas started much earlier then the conquest of say South Africa. The "Amerindian cultures...gradually accepted cultural elements from their European neighbors in a process often called acculturation." (Curtin 73) The Spanish Conquest of the Mexican region began in the 1520s and ended in 1570s. The Spanish rule over Mexico ended in the early 1800s. The Spanish had the most influence in Central Mexico where Euro diseases made the most impact, and the most Spanish missionaries were situated. The acceptance of Christianity in Mexico also played a key role in the acculturation. The Amerindians were able to more easily accept Christianity because it didn't fully break all of their other core beliefs. The Spanish had small minority groups in Mexico which it used mainly as administrators and soldiers. However, eventually small communities of farmers, merchants... came to be. Many Hispanic Indians joined these communities. About the same amount of Europeans came to Mexico as other plural societies like Central Asia or South Africa. The high birth rates of the European immigrants, and the natural decrease of Native Americans, led for the two populations to join together. This new Mexican culture was much more integrated then in places like South Africa and Central Asia.
Why did the same type of thing happen in North America?
Why did the same type of thing happen in North America?
Curtin Chapter 4
Curtin mainly talks about plural societies in chapter 4. Curtin asks what are the differences between Plural societies like South Africa and Soviet Central Asia? Curtin distinguishes these Plural societies as places which did not integrate. Groups of foreigners migrated in and formed their own communities in the state. Sometimes the foreigners formed a majority. As Europeans migrated to South Africa, they took the best land, the best jobs...The Africans still farmed, but in general the minority Europeans were in power. Central Asia was already extremely mixed, more so then South Africa. The Soviet Union attempted to create a common language between the five states they created, but failed. However, the amount of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants is quite noticeable. Kazakhstan, by 1911 was 40% Russian. In 1988 Soviet Central Asia had 49 million people, of which 25% were European. South Africa had 35 million people, of which 14% were white. However, both countries shared that non-Europeans grew faster in numbers then Europeans. However, the Europeans did have periods in which they rose quickly. Mainly from immigration, better diet, better health. Especially during the 1950s many people migrated to different places. However, by 1989 those numbers dropped. The Five Soviet states, except Kazakhstan, were named after their majority ethnic group. At the same time, the Russian minorities always had prominent positions, and usually were the second largest ethnic group in the country. The two areas sometimes took very similar and very different approaches to the problem of race. In terms of education, supposedly the Soviet Union advocated for equal education for everybody organized by the Communist Party. They created schools in central Asia, these really helped Russians more then anything but the attempt was there. In South Africa no attempt was there. If the Europeans had really wanted to make South Africans part of their culture they would created a system of free public education. As they didn't we see where their hearts lied. It wasn't until the 1950s that a very poor system of education was created for the South Africans. It made sense not to give them too good of an education, they were barred from the “most skilled and professional positions” anyways. Next Curtin talks about religion. Christianity had a strong hold in pre-revolutionary Russia and Colonial South Africa. Christian missionaries didn't make much of an effort to convert the Central Asian people and never had much success trying to convert Muslims. In South Africa however, they had much better chances. They ended up converting about half the South African population. Both the Soviet and South African governments “favored high productivity”. The South Africans encouraged an income barrier between races. Soviet Central Asia was a direct economy. Both areas were moderately successful. Nationalism spread among the colonies very quickly. Especially in places where multiple cultures presided. The Soviets tried to get rid of these nationalist ideas based on race and tried to form a common nationality based on language. The Soviets ended up giving five areas in Central Asia partial autonomy (as they were still under soviet rule. South Africa did the same thing with what it called homelands. The South African idea completely failed. Plural societies had ethnic problems lasting long after their European colonizers left. In fact, its because of the Europeans' rule that many of these ethnic problems exist.
If the European really wanted to keep their colonies, why didn't they try to push integration? Were there benefits for Europeans to move to those plural societies?
If the European really wanted to keep their colonies, why didn't they try to push integration? Were there benefits for Europeans to move to those plural societies?
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