The Last Crit

Julien Benichou
October 29, 2007
Tom Laichas
The other side of History

The New Importance of Diffusion and Non-diffusion:
Bringing Industry and Nationalism to a Central level.

The two most successful modernizing countries in the world, the Ottoman Empire and Japan, shared much in common. While reading about all these countries which underwent defensive modernization, I started to wonder what separated Japan and the Ottomans to such an extent from the other countries. They modernized militarily, administratively, and even culturally. But Siam had did so as well and ended up losing territory to the French and British. “It is significant...that the response of the Ganda, who were overcome, and that of the Japanese, who came close to overtaking the United States in military power, have so much in common.” (Curtin 172) Yet while looking at the histories of the Japanese and the Ottomans, one cannot fail to notice how Japan gained more of an edge on the world scene then the Ottoman empire; even now in the present (with Japan compared to modern Turkey). So then the new question arises, “why did Japan succeed while the Ottoman Empire crumbled?” Successful centralization and nationalism led to a more successful Japan while cultural conservatism and separate nationalities led to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire.
The Japanese differed from the rest of world because they created industry and tried to become independent of Western imports as much as they could. “Worldwide, most efforts at defensive armament concentrated on securing Western weapons. The Japanese did this as well, but their effort extended beyond mere acquisition and use of the Western tools to manufacturing them on their own and improving the designs where possible” (Curtin 165). Countries like Buganda depended on weapons shipments from other countries (under British rule) and therefore had a lot of influence by the West. Japan got involved in protectionism. Japan had very few natural resources so it needed a strong manufacturing base. Japanese imports and exports became so successful that, “the imports and exports together aggreagted 26,000,000 yen in 1868; in 1872, 50,000,000; in 1878, 58,000,000; in 1888, 131,000,000; in 1894, 230,000,000, and in 1895, 264,000,000--- being an increase of 1000 per cent. in twenty-eight years.” ( Progress of Japan) Japan, unlike Europe, began creating a heavy industry and improving its mining techniques. This meant that small goods like textiles only came later in Japanese society. This sort of autonomous industrialization led to Japan becoming a valid opponent to the west. Historians have stated how Japan's system under the Tokugawa seemed similar to the European feudal system. Political centralization and military modernization led to top officials having a Western view, which allowed Japan to move forward.
The Ottomans modernized slowly but surely. The Ottomans had been a Western opponent for some time, “in the 1400s and 1500s...southeast Europe...faced an Ottoman threat.” (Curtin 173). The Ottomans had a certain amount of “cultural chauvinism” (Curtin 173) which led them to disavow most Western concepts (except one's involved with the military). After France's invasion of Egypt in 1798, the French turned to Syria. The Ottomans, only saved some of their territory because the British intervened, began to understand the need for modernization in Ottoman society. Curtin does not mention it, but the Crimean war also played a large role in Ottoman modernization. Britain, France, and Austria came to the Ottoman Empire's aid during the Crimean war. The Ottoman empire, which had no railroads and very few telegraphs, was having trouble controlling its provinces. Britain, France, and Austria, having spent a lot of resources on the Crimean war wanted to make sure that the Ottoman empire could control its borders. Western businessmen and administrators flooded into the Ottoman empire to help with its modernization. Their aid helped the Ottomans change from a relatively backwards society which had an mediocre military, to a more worldly player. Until in 1873 the long depression caused the Ottoman stock market to crash and kept the Ottoman's to be in an economic pit until 1896. When the Young Turks came to power, they invoked reforms which brought the Ottoman Empire to a new level. Modernization never came simply to the Ottoman Empire. Two main voices of dissent arose through modernization: the traditionalist Muslim voice, and the non-Muslims who began to feel a sense of nationalism. These voices combined kept the Ottoman Empire from reaching its full potential.
The Ottoman Empire had problems with unification which the Japanese did not, causing slower growth. Without having a completely unified Ottoman Empire, making changes proved difficult. Unlike in Japan where “the new military technology...made possible the unification of Japan” (Curtin 157), the Ottomans had some advanced military technology (which they copied from their border with Europe) but that didn't help them with unification. With such a diverse population, the Ottomans needed something to unite everybody. The Ottoman Empire, though being a Muslim empire, had a large population of none-Muslims, “The millet system was designed to protect Islam by segregating dissident religious groups, but it gave those groups the common experience that made them think of themselves as nations.” (Curtin 181). The Ottoman Empire became the textbook example of the state-nation category of Nationalism. The Ottomans ended up in a difficult situation: modernization had to occur if the Ottomans wanted to retain their way of life, but that would also lead to the none-Muslims having a stronger sense of nationalism. "The Ottoman Empire had special problems. It was a Muslim empire ruling over many non-Muslims. The Meji reformers in Japan had no such nationalities problems to deal with." (Curtin 184) Modernization ends up leading to Nationalist principles to rise because it usually leads to mass mobilization. New armies were made out of masses of people. This meant that the Ottoman Empire had to choose an official language which everybody in the empire must learn. This also meant that the Ottoman Empire had to choose what customs to teach in schools. Nationalist in the millet ended up using the West as an ally against its Ottoman ruler. The Ottomans never solved its nationalities problems, and they led it to enter into World War I, the end of the Ottoman Empire.
The Japanese under the Meiji had already been unified by the Tokugawa regime, but faced other problems. This meant that Japan did not have to worry about dissenting nationalists causing problems. Instead the Japanese had to deal with the daimyo and their Samurai who resented the modernization of Japan. The Meiji restoration claimed that it would protect and strengthen Japanese tradition. Aside from not wanting to lose tradition, the daimyo and Samurai also feared that they would lose their power, so they backed the restoration. The Meiji restoration ended up doing the exact opposite of what it claimed it would do, “They changed the locus of power in Japanese society by modernizing the army and navy and setting up a Wester-style government administration to support it” (Curtin 164). Ironically, “within a decade it wiped out the powers of the daimyo as well as the bakufu” (Curtin 163). But the daimyo didn't leave without a fight. These radical changes in society led to a number of revolts including the Satsuma Rebellion. However, these revolts were swiftly stifled by the new Imperial Japanese Army. By doing so the new Meiji oligarchy consolidated its power and formed a strong central government with the emperor as a suitable figurehead. With this new stability, and the end of the opposition from the traditional daimyo, the new government had a clear path to becoming an industrial power by 1905.
The Ottomans also had their conservative issues. The Sultan, being a Caliph, had strong Islamic ties. As stated above, the Ottomans had created the millet system in order to preserve their Muslim side. The Sultan retained legitimacy by keeping his conservative Muslim ties. “Religion was more central to the Ottoman state than it was to Japan” (Curtin 175) But this conservatism caused severe problems to the question of modernization. As other countries feared, the Ottoman Empire feared losing its own culture by adopting Western technologies and techniques. At the same time, it knew that it must modernize in order to preserve its culture. This meant that modernization came in piece; slowly. "Fundamental reforms such as those imposed on Japan by the Meiji oligarchy would have required even more complex revolutionary changes in Ottoman society, and those changes were slow to come" (Curtin 182) Unlike Meiji Japan which quickly threw away its traditionalist values with relatively little cost, if the Sultan were to embrace secularism he would no longer have any form of legitimacy among the large Muslim community. The easiest way to save the country from foreign rule with the least amount of radical reform was to modernize the military. However, with the rise of a more Western military, came more Western military officers in favor of modernizing. These officers helped create a Western elite in the Ottoman Empire. These Western elites, unhappy with how slow the country was progressing, formed an organization called the Young Turks and took over the country. The Young Turks favored modernization and secularism over religion. However, a large fundamentalist Islamic section of the population remained spiteful of the changes which the Young Turks and later Mustafa Kemal were to bring.
Japan, having more political stability, broke ahead of the Ottoman Empire. According to the world bank, Japan has the second largest GDP in the world, Turkey (what can be considered the successor to the Ottoman Empire) has the 18th (still extremely successful) (List of Countries by GDP Wikipedia). What this means is that Japan's modernization was more successful then the Ottoman's or Turkey's. The only partial cure for the Ottoman Empire's nationalities problem was to split the empire up. Mustafa Kemal did a relatively good job of joining the Turkish population. However, we can still see many of the same problems in Turkey today. Especially recently with the PKK. That radical Islamic strain still exists in Turkey and resents the secular government which has been put in place because of Kemal. Japan itself has some nationalities problems, but in general remains stable. Unlike Turkey, its centralization came off without real problems, which led for it to advance quickly. Also Japan's large manufacturing base and capital from investments really gave it an advantage over Turkey. In some sense, Japan fired like a bullet once it realized it needed to modernize and beat colonization by a long shot. Turkey, slowed by its cultural chauvinism and multinational dissent, won the race with colonization following at its footsteps.
Works Cited
Curtin, Philip D. The World & the West. New York: Cambridge UP, 2000.

"List of Countries by GDP." Wikipedia. 1 Nov. 2007. .

"Progress of Japan." Los Angeles Times 3 Feb. 1897. Proquest.Julien Benichou
October 29, 2007
Tom Laichas
The other side of History

The New Importance of Diffusion and Non-diffusion:
Bringing Industry and Nationalism to a Central level.

The two most successful modernizing countries in the world, the Ottoman Empire and Japan, shared much in common. While reading about all these countries which underwent defensive modernization, I started to wonder what separated Japan and the Ottomans to such an extent from the other countries. They modernized militarily, administratively, and even culturally. But Siam had did so as well and ended up losing territory to the French and British. “It is significant...that the response of the Ganda, who were overcome, and that of the Japanese, who came close to overtaking the United States in military power, have so much in common.” (Curtin 172) Yet while looking at the histories of the Japanese and the Ottomans, one cannot fail to notice how Japan gained more of an edge on the world scene then the Ottoman empire; even now in the present (with Japan compared to modern Turkey). So then the new question arises, “why did Japan succeed while the Ottoman Empire crumbled?” Successful centralization and nationalism led to a more successful Japan while cultural conservatism and separate nationalities led to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire.
The Japanese differed from the rest of world because they created industry and tried to become independent of Western imports as much as they could. “Worldwide, most efforts at defensive armament concentrated on securing Western weapons. The Japanese did this as well, but their effort extended beyond mere acquisition and use of the Western tools to manufacturing them on their own and improving the designs where possible” (Curtin 165). Countries like Buganda depended on weapons shipments from other countries (under British rule) and therefore had a lot of influence by the West. Japan got involved in protectionism. Japan had very few natural resources so it needed a strong manufacturing base. Japanese imports and exports became so successful that, “the imports and exports together aggreagted 26,000,000 yen in 1868; in 1872, 50,000,000; in 1878, 58,000,000; in 1888, 131,000,000; in 1894, 230,000,000, and in 1895, 264,000,000--- being an increase of 1000 per cent. in twenty-eight years.” ( Progress of Japan) Japan, unlike Europe, began creating a heavy industry and improving its mining techniques. This meant that small goods like textiles only came later in Japanese society. This sort of autonomous industrialization led to Japan becoming a valid opponent to the west. Historians have stated how Japan's system under the Tokugawa seemed similar to the European feudal system. Political centralization and military modernization led to top officials having a Western view, which allowed Japan to move forward.
The Ottomans modernized slowly but surely. The Ottomans had been a Western opponent for some time, “in the 1400s and 1500s...southeast Europe...faced an Ottoman threat.” (Curtin 173). The Ottomans had a certain amount of “cultural chauvinism” (Curtin 173) which led them to disavow most Western concepts (except one's involved with the military). After France's invasion of Egypt in 1798, the French turned to Syria. The Ottomans, only saved some of their territory because the British intervened, began to understand the need for modernization in Ottoman society. Curtin does not mention it, but the Crimean war also played a large role in Ottoman modernization. Britain, France, and Austria came to the Ottoman Empire's aid during the Crimean war. The Ottoman empire, which had no railroads and very few telegraphs, was having trouble controlling its provinces. Britain, France, and Austria, having spent a lot of resources on the Crimean war wanted to make sure that the Ottoman empire could control its borders. Western businessmen and administrators flooded into the Ottoman empire to help with its modernization. Their aid helped the Ottomans change from a relatively backwards society which had an mediocre military, to a more worldly player. Until in 1873 the long depression caused the Ottoman stock market to crash and kept the Ottoman's to be in an economic pit until 1896. When the Young Turks came to power, they invoked reforms which brought the Ottoman Empire to a new level. Modernization never came simply to the Ottoman Empire. Two main voices of dissent arose through modernization: the traditionalist Muslim voice, and the non-Muslims who began to feel a sense of nationalism. These voices combined kept the Ottoman Empire from reaching its full potential.
The Ottoman Empire had problems with unification which the Japanese did not, causing slower growth. Without having a completely unified Ottoman Empire, making changes proved difficult. Unlike in Japan where “the new military technology...made possible the unification of Japan” (Curtin 157), the Ottomans had some advanced military technology (which they copied from their border with Europe) but that didn't help them with unification. With such a diverse population, the Ottomans needed something to unite everybody. The Ottoman Empire, though being a Muslim empire, had a large population of none-Muslims, “The millet system was designed to protect Islam by segregating dissident religious groups, but it gave those groups the common experience that made them think of themselves as nations.” (Curtin 181). The Ottoman Empire became the textbook example of the state-nation category of Nationalism. The Ottomans ended up in a difficult situation: modernization had to occur if the Ottomans wanted to retain their way of life, but that would also lead to the none-Muslims having a stronger sense of nationalism. "The Ottoman Empire had special problems. It was a Muslim empire ruling over many non-Muslims. The Meji reformers in Japan had no such nationalities problems to deal with." (Curtin 184) Modernization ends up leading to Nationalist principles to rise because it usually leads to mass mobilization. New armies were made out of masses of people. This meant that the Ottoman Empire had to choose an official language which everybody in the empire must learn. This also meant that the Ottoman Empire had to choose what customs to teach in schools. Nationalist in the millet ended up using the West as an ally against its Ottoman ruler. The Ottomans never solved its nationalities problems, and they led it to enter into World War I, the end of the Ottoman Empire.
The Japanese under the Meiji had already been unified by the Tokugawa regime, but faced other problems. This meant that Japan did not have to worry about dissenting nationalists causing problems. Instead the Japanese had to deal with the daimyo and their Samurai who resented the modernization of Japan. The Meiji restoration claimed that it would protect and strengthen Japanese tradition. Aside from not wanting to lose tradition, the daimyo and Samurai also feared that they would lose their power, so they backed the restoration. The Meiji restoration ended up doing the exact opposite of what it claimed it would do, “They changed the locus of power in Japanese society by modernizing the army and navy and setting up a Wester-style government administration to support it” (Curtin 164). Ironically, “within a decade it wiped out the powers of the daimyo as well as the bakufu” (Curtin 163). But the daimyo didn't leave without a fight. These radical changes in society led to a number of revolts including the Satsuma Rebellion. However, these revolts were swiftly stifled by the new Imperial Japanese Army. By doing so the new Meiji oligarchy consolidated its power and formed a strong central government with the emperor as a suitable figurehead. With this new stability, and the end of the opposition from the traditional daimyo, the new government had a clear path to becoming an industrial power by 1905.
The Ottomans also had their conservative issues. The Sultan, being a Caliph, had strong Islamic ties. As stated above, the Ottomans had created the millet system in order to preserve their Muslim side. The Sultan retained legitimacy by keeping his conservative Muslim ties. “Religion was more central to the Ottoman state than it was to Japan” (Curtin 175) But this conservatism caused severe problems to the question of modernization. As other countries feared, the Ottoman Empire feared losing its own culture by adopting Western technologies and techniques. At the same time, it knew that it must modernize in order to preserve its culture. This meant that modernization came in piece; slowly. "Fundamental reforms such as those imposed on Japan by the Meiji oligarchy would have required even more complex revolutionary changes in Ottoman society, and those changes were slow to come" (Curtin 182) Unlike Meiji Japan which quickly threw away its traditionalist values with relatively little cost, if the Sultan were to embrace secularism he would no longer have any form of legitimacy among the large Muslim community. The easiest way to save the country from foreign rule with the least amount of radical reform was to modernize the military. However, with the rise of a more Western military, came more Western military officers in favor of modernizing. These officers helped create a Western elite in the Ottoman Empire. These Western elites, unhappy with how slow the country was progressing, formed an organization called the Young Turks and took over the country. The Young Turks favored modernization and secularism over religion. However, a large fundamentalist Islamic section of the population remained spiteful of the changes which the Young Turks and later Mustafa Kemal were to bring.
Japan, having more political stability, broke ahead of the Ottoman Empire. According to the world bank, Japan has the second largest GDP in the world, Turkey (what can be considered the successor to the Ottoman Empire) has the 18th (still extremely successful) (List of Countries by GDP Wikipedia). What this means is that Japan's modernization was more successful then the Ottoman's or Turkey's. The only partial cure for the Ottoman Empire's nationalities problem was to split the empire up. Mustafa Kemal did a relatively good job of joining the Turkish population. However, we can still see many of the same problems in Turkey today. Especially recently with the PKK. That radical Islamic strain still exists in Turkey and resents the secular government which has been put in place because of Kemal. Japan itself has some nationalities problems, but in general remains stable. Unlike Turkey, its centralization came off without real problems, which led for it to advance quickly. Also Japan's large manufacturing base and capital from investments really gave it an advantage over Turkey. In some sense, Japan fired like a bullet once it realized it needed to modernize and beat colonization by a long shot. Turkey, slowed by its cultural chauvinism and multinational dissent, won the race with colonization following at its footsteps.
Works Cited
Curtin, Philip D. The World & the West. New York: Cambridge UP, 2000.

"List of Countries by GDP." Wikipedia. 1 Nov. 2007. .

"Progress of Japan." Los Angeles Times 3 Feb. 1897. Proquest.

Curtin Chapter 10

The Ottoman Empire was one of the three biggest Islamic Centers. During the 1400s and 1500s South East Europe faced a very prominent Ottoman nation. During the 1600s, when military might started turning to the European's favor, the Ottoman hadn't become completely aware of what was about to begin.The Ottomans didn't bother with worrying about the west because of "cultural chauvinism".
Like the Japanese, the Ottomans needed to achieve more then just modern weapons. They also needed to change their social and political organization. Religion was a very central part of Ottoman government. Unlike in the west where it was believed that government and religion played separate roles, the shari'a laws were still in place in the Ottoman empire and made sure that church and state remained one. The Ottoman sultan was the leader of two administrative hierarchies, one was secular and the other was religious.
The military had a particular role in Ottoman empire as it was an independent source of power. Sometimes the military was a little bit out of the Sultan's control. Another major source of power were the ayan, provincial "big men" or quasi-feudal landholders, tax farmers. Some of them had enough power to form local dynasties.
The Ottoman empire, spanning such a wide area, had a lot of nationalities problems. The Sultan retained some legitimacy by stating he was the Caliph, a descendant of Mohamed.However, large portion of the population wasn't Muslim. For example, large parts of the Ottoman empire were none-believers. These consisted of the Armenian Christians, the Greek Christians, a few Catholic Christians, and the Jewish Community scattered throughout the empire. Being a Muslim state, other religions couldn't get the same benefits as Muslim. However, the Sultan did recognize other religions as legitimate and let them practice their religion. He did so by organizing other religions into what were called millets. People in millets had to form communities of their own and pay higher taxes. This tactic stemmed national feelings for autonomy (at least for a while).
The Christian-Ottoman border was a place of tension for both sides. Having fought many wars over it, both sides kept a close watch on the other side. While doing so they made sure to copy what seemed useful. For the Ottomans however, that mainly stopped at the Military level. The Ottomans had a certain amount of "Cultural Conservatism" (Curtin 178) which led them to disown many European practices. Curtin uses the printing press as an example of this conservatism.
In 1798, the French invaded Egypt and started fighting Ottoman armies in Syria. The Ottomans would have lost if the British had not intervened and stopped the French. Though the Sultan at the time, Selim III, realized how the Ottoman empire was falling behind. He realized that the Ottoman empire needed to have military reforms backed by economic and fiscal reforms. He issued a set of regulations called the New Order.
Two things end up happening with this New Order. First it brings to power the military officers who have been trained in the Western Style. These officers not only admire Western military technology but other things Western as well. Second the Old Order will become increasingly threatened and alienated.
Then, the people of the millets started feeling a rising sense of national identity. They believed that they should have their own sovereign nations. There are two ways that Nationalism can come up. The first is the State-Nation type, when the state came first and led to the nationalist feelings. The second is the Nation-State type, when people who had a common language and heritage began to think that they were their own separate nation. The main problem was with the Millet system. Though it kept the state religion safe, it alienated the other groups and gave them the idea that they were their own nation.
At the same time, Europe began taking chunks of the Ottoman empire. The millets were hardly more Western then the Ottomans, but they used modernization and the West to achieve their means against their Ottoman rulers. The Western model became much stronger among the millets then among the rest of Ottoman society.
"Fundamental reforms such as those imposed on Japan by the Meji oligarchy would have required even more complex revolutionary changes in Ottoman society, and those changes were slow to come" (Curtin 182) However, slow changes did come to keep the Ottoman empire from destruction for a while. The Janissary revolt in 1826 led to the Ottoman Empire having Western Educated officers who in turn influenced technological advances and the structure of the government. The central government started infringing on Ayan and threatened the privileges of the millet. A central power was necessary for modernization but it was disputed who should have that central power. The Western style Ottomans attempted to create a constitutional monarchy, but the Sultan threw out the constitution after only 2 years of its existence.
A revolution occurred from a group who called themselves the Young Turks. These were the Ottoman Elites who thought felt as though the country needed to modernize faster and that the Sultan's despotism was ruining the country. The Young Turks sought to modernize in order to preserve Ottoman society.
"The Ottoman Empire had special problems. It was a Muslim empire ruling over many non-Muslims. The Meji reformers in Japan had no such nationalities problems to deal with." (Curtin 184) The Young Turks ended up suppressing the millets, crushing nationalist revolts, and engaging in two Balkan wars which led them to enter WWI and lose.
After WWI Europe Partitioned the Ottoman empire (though the government itself still sort of existed). A group called the Association for Defense, based in the Anatolian Plateau, formed a resistance against the Western European powers. It obtained the treaty of Lausanne, which gave the the Ankara government the border which are now Turkey and freedom from European provisions.
In 1924, Mustafa Kemal set up a Turkish government which sent Turkey on a modernizing road which couldn't be easily erased. However, the problem of nationality still threatened the new Turkish empire. Kemal needed to find a common Turkish nationality. He could have attempted to recapture the old Ottoman empire and try to invoke a sense of nationality through being part of the Ottoman empire.Or he could have used the old Ottoman tactic of tried to be a leader in the Islamic world (though this went against Kemal's ways). There was also the idea of a linguistic nationality.Kemal decided to attempt to work with the territory which was given to him.
Turkey resembled a Nation-State which still had some nation building to do. Turkey did so by trying to legitimize the Turkish identity. In order to convert the faithful they took away the Sultan's title of Caliph and then gave it to his cousin. They also changed the capital from Istanbul to Ankara. In 1824, the office of Caliph was abolished showing that Turkey had become a completely secular state. It became a Republic with Kemal as president.
Kemal faced an uphill battle against the Islamic none-secularists who believed that Churched and state would be one. He was able to find most of these reactionaries in the 1926 revolts in Turkey. Kemal crushed these revolts and even secularized the country even more by throwing out the former Muslim Civil law and created a new civil code based on Swiss law. Kemal also changed the Turkish alphabet, which was best suited for use with the European alphabet. Though this had many advantages, it seemed to many people another form of secularization. The language reform led to a better education system with more literary rates, which in essence led to better communication which could allow for higher productivity and consumption.

Curtin chapter 9

Japan was the most successful none Western country to achieve as much power as other Western countries. We start this history with the Tokugawa. The Western threat led the Japanese to need to modernize their military. In the 1600s, new military technology led the Tokugawa Shogunate to unify Japan. The Tokugawa, weary of outside powers, limited Japan's trading to only agree to trade with the Chinese and the Dutch.The Tokugawa brought Japan about 2.5 centuries of peace.
Before the Tokugawa, Japan was divided into thousands of competing units. These units consisted of daimyos who had their own private armies full of Samurai. The system itself resembled European feudalism with a few distinct differences. The Tokugawa's, "Political centralization was both a cause and a consequence of the military changes." (Curtin 158)The Tokugawa brought about huge social and economic changes. Agricultural output approximately doubled between 1600 and 1850. (Curtin 160) Historians think that two things may have been important to Japan's successful modernization: The 250 years of relative external peace, and the inner struggles in Japan itself.
In the 1860s and 70s a revolution hit Japan.By 1868 the Meiji emperor had been restored. However, the emperor himself had little more. The society was an oligarchy with an aristocratic government under the emperor who basically made all the decisions. This oligarchy modernized Japanese society by borrowing techniques and institution from the West.
Military technology promoted most of Japan's growth.In 1842, after China had been bombarded by Britain's Navy, the Japanese realized they needed to modernize militarily quickly. The American fleet arriving in Japan in 1852 also showed Japan how it needed to modernize quickly. The sides which revolted against the Tokugawa were military oligarchies competing to perform the same tasks. At the same time, the oligarchies claimed that they would retain Japanese traditions, but within a decade they had removed the daimyo and bakufu. The new oligarchy changed the balance of power in Japan by modernizing the army and setting up a Western-style government.
Most other countries trying to modernize militarily focused on getting Western guns and letting the West supply them with guns. Japan not only did this, but started producing the weapons in their own factories in order to lose their dependency on the West.
The West had begun its industrialization with small textile and labor saving machines. But by the time Japan entered the game, bigger industries had been created. Japan decided to focus first on heavy industry and mining technology instead of following the exact route that the west did.
The new Japanese industries were created by the state for military purposes. But by the 1880s the industries went through privatization. By the 1890s a relationship between the industry and the government had been formed. Japan's only real similarity to the West remained technological, the government itself may have seemed Western but it had a lot of Japanese aspects to it.
Japan also needed to show the world that it was on equal footing with the West. Modernization was to protect Japan against the hostile west, but it also needed to show the west it could take care of itself. The first thing Japan needed to do was have a modernized military to show the world it could defend itself. It also adopted a constitution to show the West it was civilized.
The Constitution itself could not be change by anybody except the emperor. In fact, people changed constitution practice leading to the militarism in the 30s and 40s. When it was stated that only military men could fill the posts of minister of war and minister of the navy, it narrowed the prime ministers options dramatically and led to a more militaristic state. The Western models in Japan were always slightly different then those in the West.
In general leaders in all the countries which went through defensive modernization failed to see the obvious change which the west was making the world go through. In the end the only reason why they modernized was to protect themselves and have certain Western habits which seemed nice.
How come the Ganda were overcome by the West, but the Japanese were not, even though the stories have so much in common? What were the benefits of only letting the Chinese and Dutch trade with them in their early modernization days? Why didn't the west ever launch an assault on Japan?

The VOC (Dutch East-India Company) was created around the same time as the BEIC. It also had many of the same rights which the BEIC had.Spices were a huge commodity. They were low bulk but could be sold at high prices. The Europeans acted as the middle man for all products except spices. By 1500, coffee was grown in souther Yemen. They then sold coffee to Arabia. As the Arabians couldn't drink alcohol, they drank coffee instead. Very few peasants were involved in the International coffee trade. By the mid 1600s-1700s, coffee houses started appearing across European port towns. Coffee houses were perfect for port towns where business men would meet to discuss and make trades. The demand for coffee increased and the BEIC and VOC decided to try and make peasants in the countries they grow it. The British failed to grow coffee, but the Dutch were able to grow coffee in Java. The Dutch demanded that peasants in Java grow coffee, the Javanese peasants didn't want to. The Portuguese also tried to grow coffee. They brought in African slaves to grow coffee in Brazil. This created a class called the coffee barons who held a lot of power.The BEIC and Britain tried to grow coffee in Kenya.
Places where coffee is grown now are European footprints of where they tried to force the production of coffee.
The VOC's goal was to control the spice trade, and they did so through conquest. The VOC was giving 18% dividends to its investors (quite a good dividend). The VOC ends up becoming involved with governments and forms a powerful military. The VOC controlled all of Indonesia. The Japanese only allowed the Dutch to trade with them. The Dutch had access to one port, which led to the Japanese Dutch education. The VOC was liquidated in 1800 for 2 reasons: Napoleon took over and needed money. Other interests in Holland which wanted more power which the VOC had. The VOC had a moment of weakness so the other companies took over.

September 28th, 2007

The BEIC (British East India Company) and VOC were governments within governments. They didn't have autonomy, but they had a lot of things governments could do. BEIC was a political power in India. Their officer core was British but had a lot of Indians. BEIC had 125 investors who put in 72,000 pounds into the company. States were strapped for cash. A lot of states feared states with economic power. It could threaten the government, a lot of government wouldn't let that happen. A lot of governments gave and took monopolies without warning. They didn't want anybody to take away sovereignty. In Europe this option isn't available. Governments create companies where wealthy people will invest. Both government and wealth people can make money off of this arrangement. these are called Rentier States: government creates an enterprise which it takes off to the top of.
The BEIC originally had a charter of 21 year. This was in case the company grew too large. BEIC became useful to the Mughal empire. The BEIC received certain ports where it could sell its goods. At the same time the BEIC took Indian goods to Western Europe. This brings a lot of revenue to the Mughals, especially as their navy cannot reach Europe. The BEIC became a Mughal vassel. By 1670 Charles the 1st allowed for the BEIC to acquire territory (as it already sort of had a military), bring currency, build fortresses, make alliances, create war and peace, and make its own laws.It basically becomes a government.
The BEIC is a charter of the British royalty, it places its loyalty in the throne, not the parliament. At the same time, the BEIC bribes people in parliament so that they will not allow other private companies to join in on their profits (make sure they stay a monopoly). The BEIC now finds itself under British and Mughal protection. The crown gave the BEIC more power so that it would gain more money. All trade with India would be handled by BEIC, killing all other competition.
By 1750s: Mughal Empire starts breaking up to form other empires. A battle between the French and the British began, trade war. The war mainly occurred in the West Indies and India. The BEIC felt threatened by French companies. When the French lost the war, the BEIC assumed all the trading roles in India. By 1800, the BEIC controls most of India.
The BEIC becomes an important world player.

Curtin Chapter 8

Curtin Chapter 8

Curtin begins this chapter by talking about agriculture: how it came to be, and when it came to be in different parts of the world (as far as we know). He's using agriculture to talk about the broader idea of diffusion. Of course the rate of diffusion depends mostly on the size of the population and the modes of transportation (in our modern world, ideas spread much more rapidly across the globe then they did in the stone age). With diffusion taking on a more major role in history, we can see a progression where intercommunication has become more global, cheaper, and faster. Curtin uses Islam and gunpowder as examples of diffusion. With diffusion also comes non-diffusion. An example of non-diffusion would be the Romans' refusal to use stirrups. They had seen stirrups and their effectiveness, but they chose to stick with chariots. We can also see one-sided non-diffusion. For example, when the west borrowed ideas from the Chinese, but the Chinese did not borrow back. Sometimes diffusion, though not necessarily wanted, becomes necessary to keep up with growing technology. For example, the Chinese alphabet and language has become a burden to computer programmers. Instead they tend to use English instead of Chinese. From the middle ages the West found itself borrowing a lot of things from the rest of the world. The West combined borrowing and innovation to create new techs which were better then the ones they borrowed. Asians before 1700, on the other hand, had no intention of borrowing from the West. When the West's production far outmatched that of the Asians, many Asians wanted the same productivity, but they did not want to lost their own sense of identity. However, at the same time if a country were to be taken over by a Western country, their whole way of life would be threatened. This meant that countries needed to modernize in order to avoid annexation by the West. This usually meant beginning with military modernization, imitations of Western military technology and methods. Military modernization couldn't be done without a certain amount of imitation in social ways, education, and political life. Curtin then goes into the Neo-Inca resistance because it was one of the earliest examples of defensive modernization with the Inca borrowing some things from Spanish culture and keeping some of their own culture. Peter in Russia decided to modernize, not only for defense, but also to expand the Russian empire. Peter's modernization did not just stop with the military. Peter attempted to take anything from the West which could make Russia more of a contender on the world scene. In Ganda two things interested them the most: arms and religion. Ganda was able to use both to channel and limit European influence. Of course there were social consequences. The office of Kabaka was strengthened at the expense of other elite groups. Client-chiefs ended up gaining a lot of power. When Uganda came to be, a landlord class was created. Ganda borrowed from the West but did not change their societies in a Western manner. Ganda did not want to imitate Europe, they just wanted to protect their values by borrowing a few concepts. Hawaii was a good example of how a country needed to give the appearance of being a Western style country in order to wade off annexation. In the 1820s, European and American missionaries came and helped the Monarchy in Hawaii form a Western-Style, making Western countries think that the island could handle its own political affairs. Hawaii avoided annexation by partly modernizing society and by playing Euro rivalries against each other (kind of like Mutesa). However, by the 1890s, a series of coups and counter coups showed that the west was gaining more influence in Hawaii. Also with the U.S.'s new wish to become an imperial country, Hawaii could be a good door to move to the East. In Madagascar the quick acquisition of firearms allowed for it to create a secondary empire. Missionaries came in 1820, and had converted the island by 1869. Imerina enjoyed quite a few Western aspects but their system was mostly based on forced-labor and slavery. They lacked the flexible Western administration and any kind of popular support. This meant that when the French came, the modernized army lacked administrative support and only had a minor resistance to the French invaders. Siam, on the other hand, was so successful with its military and social organization that it never came under European control (though parts of the Siamese empire). In the mid 1800s, Siam began the road for military organization. The Siamese played the French in Indochina against the British in Malaya. But this came at a price, it had to cede certain territories to France and some to Britain. The Siamese also started modernizing the administration. Siam created an effective tax base, and a system of public education.

Curtin Chapter 7

Curtin Chapter 7
Curtin asks the question in Chapter 7, why did other culture switch to other forms of belief. He states how modern religions have a doctrinal basis meant to convert non-believers. But he admits that there had to be something else in play because so many countries did not convert. Curtin believes that religious change came from a response by the converted peoples. In this chapter Curtin explorers the reaction to missionaries by East Africa and more specifically Buganda. East Africa cannot be considered typical and Buganda can be considered unique. Before 1800 the main outsiders to come to East Africa were Arabs. The Arabs created trade diasporas and fortified towns. They never attempted to rule over East African territory. In the 1800s two economic situations happened: the price of ivory shot up which created an increase in exports, and cloves of spices were found to grow extremely well in Zazibar and Pemba which created a need for labor which would be satisfied by an increase in the slave trade. In the early 1800s the Sultan of Muscat in Oman wanted to increase his commercial advantage. Soon after the Afro-Arab trading diaspora turned into an Omani trading empire. In the mid 1800s, Zanzibar and Swahili began moving into the interior of East Africa and created a secondary empire. By the 1890s Britain had officially made Zanzibar a protectorate (before that it had a lot of influence on Zanzibar). Christian missionaries began to appear in the 1840s. In some regions missionaries created small secondary empires. In general though, missionaries liked entering big kingdoms like Buganda which had already begun creating secondary empires. This gave the missionaries security.
The ruler with the title of Kubaka (the King) was called Mutesa I. He had modernized the army to include muskets as its primary weapon. Buganda also had administrative organization with its political constitution. The system in Buganda led there to be many clan leaders who the King had to rule over and through. By the 1700s the Kabaka were putting in Bakungu or Client-Chiefs, who could be removed by the Kabaka (this got rid of the lineage aspect to the constitution). The Kabaka also sent a multitude of semiprofessional warriors all around the country who were only loyal to the Kabaka. The client-chiefs controlled the allocation of land on a provincial level and therefore controlled the wealth of the country which was largely based on the peasantry. Buganda had no substantial opponents after it modernized to firearms. Swahili caravans had come to Buganda with shipments of guns, but also with the first attempts to convert Buganda to Islam. By the 1870s, European employees for the Egyptian government had come down to extend Egypt's secondary empire. In 1875, Henry Morton Stanley had passed through Buganda and had talked politics with Mutesa. In a famous message to the daily telegraph he stated that Mutas was interested in Christianity. To be sure, Mutesa did want Christian missionaries in his court to balance the influence of Islamic missionaries. There were two Christian groups in Buganda, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the White Fathers. Both made strong attempts to convert Mutesa to their version of Christianity. To Mutesa the Christians offered technical knowledge and strategic insight about the threatening world beyond the African Lake district. By 1879 the Islamic influence had passed and left Mutesa's court. Though not useful to Mutesa anymore, he kept the Christin missionaries in case they might become useful again. When Mutesa died a crisis between different factions began. Mwanga, Mutesa's son, took power. He increased his power as the despot, and simultaneously increased the power of the military. In 1888, a revolt led to the exile of Mawnga and a four sided civil war. In 1893, Britain annexed Buganda with the help of the protestant factions which established themselves in Mutesa's court. This is one of the examples when missionaries came before colonization. The missionaries entered hoping to use the favorable political conditions in the country. However, the existence of all these different religions in Buganda has led to some resentment by the Muslims who aren't in power.

What Hope Remains? Myanmar Crisis. Crit Analysis

Julien Benichou
Tom Laichas
What hope remains?

With a conflict in Burma coming to a close (or so it looks), one has to stop to wonder why the oppressive military dictatorship remains in power. Can we lay blame somewhere? Should the U.N. have done more for Burma? These are all pertinent questions which may or may not have adequate answers. Will Burma ever have independence from the Junta?

The Mon people were the first to arrive in Burma, and are suspected of having ruled Burma by the mid 900s. They were some of the first people to embrace Theravada Buddhism. Then the Tibeto-Burman Pyu arrived in the 1st century B.C. They created city states and traded actively with the Mon Kingdom. As the Pyu Kingdom fell apart in about 1044, another group who caled the Burman, or the Bamar, created their own Kingdom. King Anawrahta captured the Mon Kingdom and most of what is known as present day Burma; this Kingdom came to be known as Bagan as the capital was Bagan. The Bagan Kingdom adopted Theravada Buddhism. In the 13th century, as Bagan's power slowly faded, the Mongols led by Kublai Kahn took over the northern segment of Bagan and sacked the capital city. The Mongols didn't stay long; which led the Tai-Shan people from Yunnan to take over and become a major player in South East Asian politics. The Tai-Shan broke up the original Bagan Kingdom into several sections: 1. The Burman Kingdom of Ava or Innwa in upper Burma. 2.The Mon Kingdom of Hanthawady Pegu or Bago in the South. 3.The Rakhine Kingdom in the west. 4. Several states in the east and north-east. Realize now that all these Kingdoms and states were still under Shan rulers. These Kingdoms warred a lot (especially the Ava and Bago), but Buddhism did flourish in all the nations. In 1540, the Burman Kingdom of Taungoo under Tabinshwehti, reinforced by the Ava, defeated the Bago in the South. Tabinshwehti's successor, King Bayinnaug conquered upper Burma, Manipur, Shan states, Chiang Mai, Ayutthaya, and Lan Xang; putting most of south-east Asia under his control. Bayinnaug's death basically led to the end of the Empire and the loss of most of this territory for much of Burma. Rakhine forces, aided by Portugese mercenaries, ended up invading the Kingdom's capital Bago and taking the most important seaport Thanlynin. The Portuguese mercenaries overthrew the Rakhine government in Burma and created their own government. The Burmese were able to retake their kingdom from the Portuguese in 1611, rebuild their country, and remained steadily strong. Until 1648 when the kingdom went on an 100 year decline. The Mon, aided by the French, successfully rebelled in 1740 and took South Burma. Eventually they took over North Burma as well. The Konbaung dynasty formed, and lasted until the British invasion in in 1852. The Konbaung took over Siam numerous times (though they were also thrown out numerous times), resisted invasion attempts by China multiple times, and conquered Rakhine. In 1819, the Burmese annexed a kingdom called Assam, which put their adjacent to British East India. In 1824 the British attacked Burma and ended up taking large amounts of East Burman territory. In 1852, the British faced a much weaker Burma and took over most of Southern Burman provinces. In 1885, alarmed by the French's taking of Laos, the British invaded North Burma. The British occupation of Burma was interrupted multiple times by small coups and revolts which continuously failed. In the 1940s, Aung San created the Burman Independence Army to attempt to free Burma from British Rule. In 1947, Aung San became the Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council, but was assassinated soon after. In 1948, Burma became an independent Democratic nation. In 1962, the Democratic nation was toppled by a military coup d'etat. The current military rulers are called the Junta and came to power in a rebellion in 1988.

In 1990, two years after the Junta came to power, a promised Democratic Parliamentary election was to take place. The National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of Aung San), won 392 out of the 485 seats contested.(Fuller). The National Union Party, the Junta, only won ten seats. The Junta immediately overturned the election and kept power for itself. Aun San Suu Kyi was put under house arrest and forced either to remain under house arrest or leave the country forever (she remains under house arrest to this day). Many ethnic guerilla groups formed and attempted to overthrow the government but the Junta swiftly and effectively crushed these groups (it continued to crush any groups which arose through the 90s and 2000s). The false election and violent methods of the Junta alarmed the International Community which assailed the Junta with criticism and at the same time asked that the Junta adhere to the election's results. The Junta in essence ignored this criticism and the effort made by the U.N. to legitimize the election. In June of 1993 the Junta promised to have a National Convention and write up a constitution. The National Convention does meet every once in a while, but there have been no signs of efforts to actually follow through with the promise of a constitution. On the 23 June, 1993, Burma entered the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The military government in 2006 changed the capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw (city of the kinds), basically a small city created for the top Junta officials. An oasis for the rich Junta leaders far from the poor civilians of Yangon.

Last August the Junta found itself facing Massive Protests after it raised the price of gas and diesel oil by 500% (wow that is pretty ridiculous). It did so in order to attempt to fill a budget deficit from an increase in civil servants' pay. This deficit may also have come from the 2006 move from Yangon to Naypyidaw. The Junta quickly crushed these early protests. On September 19th hundreds of Buddhist monks staged protests against the Junta. The Buddhist monks are a very strong legitimate power in Burma second only to the Junta. The Junta became increasingly strict resulting in: multiples injuries and deaths, many detainees, curfews, limitations on Internet access... The Junta not only reacted violently, but also performed late night raids on anybody who they considered dangerous to their regime. They arrested and detained hundreds of monks and civilians. Nobody is sure what happened to them, but supposedly quite a few have been set free (though many assume that many of them were murdered). The conflict seems to have ended for the time being and nobody can really say when the conflict will start up again.

We now must ask ourselves, who's left to fight against the Junta? The Junta have restricted education to limit the amount of student activism. Students have always been at the forefront of rebellion, and were at the forefront of the 1988 uprising. All political groups except that of the Junta's have been crushed. The most prominent leader of the opposing political group, Aung San Suu Kyi, remains under house arrest. Any new political leaders get killed or incarcerated (The Junta is not stupid enough to kill Aung San Suu Kyi). The Junta have nothing to fear from opposing political groups. The population has been completely frightened: when government cars roam around the streets late at night warning you that if you step out of line that you will be taken away, who can blame them. They also have no weapons, Burma has a very strict gun control policy (except for the military of course). Blunt objects versus guns usually turns out badly. Also half the population is part of an organization which is meat to spy on the general populace. People can't trust their neighbors anymore because they could be informers. The 1988 uprising also worked because government officials joined in the protests, but where are they now? As stated above they have just received a pay raise, in fact they are probably the most well off after people in the military. They risk much more then the civilians by getting involved in these political protests. Though, if they did get involved, it would cause severe internal damage to the Junta. The monks also play a key role in the opposition to the Junta. Being passive by nature, seeing monks out in the streets protesting has awakened the world to the problem in Myanmar. The monks also have a certain amount of respect from the people, this leads them to have a certain amount of power over the people's conscious. Any harm done to the monks could bring real social problems for the Junta. The Junta dealt with the monks using night raids and none-lethal capture methods. Though capturing monks still angered civilians, the Junta would have faced much deeper hatred and resentment had they openly attacked and/or killed monks in the street. Not many people actually saw these night raids so they couldn't truly understand what had gone on. At the same time by not using lethal force against the monks they have curbed the wrath of the people. According to Tom Laichas, the Junta opposition would have a good chance if the middle military officials got tired of what they were doing and revolted. This would either lead to a civil war or the forfeit and flee of the higher up military officials in the Junta. What would happen if the middle officers gained power? I have no idea. They might continue with the idea of a military dictatorship with a few changes. Ideally they would hand over the power to the people. However, it doesn't seem likely that the middle officials will rebel anytime soon.

The Junta have taken care of the situation in a pragmatic fashion. They have come to completely understand how the international community and system would react. Burma's neighboring countries do not want a civil war there because of the amount of refugees that would cross the border to their country. At the same time countries such as China and Russia do not want U.N. intervention because they have their own areas seeking independence. The U.N. did send a special envoy to Myanmar. But even Ban Ki-Moon admits that the mission was not a “success”. In fact all they really achieved was to give a “strong message” to the Junta about the violent crack down on the protests. If that message could have ever had any validity, it would have been before the protests ended. The Junta play the game: the U.N. idly sits by waiting for the Junta to get everything back in order before they go inspect. The leader of the Junta, Senior General Than Shwe kept the U.N. enoy leader, Ibrahim Gambari, waiting for three days before meeting with him. I don't see any kind of outrage at such a disrespectful act against the U.N. The Junta understands how powerless the U.N. and international law have become (I mean even the U.S. doesn't follow international law according to many experts), and therefore have no incentives to heed the U.N.'s warnings. The U.N. didn't intervene in Burma when the election of 1990 was reversed and a major crack down on political parties began, why would they intervene now?

At the same time how effective can we deem these non-violent protests? Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won the Novel-Peace Prize in 1991 for her non-violent acts, but does that mean that the country should follow her ideas? Non-Violent means can be effective for smaller things such as getting laws passed/rejected, but usually its methods aren't enough to overthrow a government. Many non-violent rebel groups end up being violent after their protests come to nothing. The only example I can think of when a non-violent group came to overthrow the current government was in India. But we must examine and understand the many differences between the Junta and the British controlling India. Mainly that the English government did not lose its power in England by letting India go. Britain was a colonial power, it sought economic advantages from its colonies (especially India). When India no longer became economically profitable and too difficult to manage, the English let it go. The Junta don't have the option of retaining their power if they let the protests succeed. Therefore (this might be opinion), using brutal methods may seem logical to keeping their power intact. In some sense, they have nothing to lose by stopping these protests by any means necessary. The problem is that all the guerrilla groups have already been destroyed by the Junta, and that half of the population informs the Junta on any misbehavior. If possible I would recommend an attempt at a more centralized armed resistance using guerrilla tactics against the Junta. I don't know exactly where the guerrillas might get their weapons, but I have no doubt that they would be able to find some. Even if the guerrillas fail, at least the international community might have a little more interest in the conflict in Burma. In any case, the time for non-violent seems to have ended and failed.
Works Cited
Fuller, Thomas. "A Look At the Opposition in Myanmar." New York Times 07 Oct. 2007. .

Fuller, Thomas. "U.N. Reports Detentions in Myanmar." New York Times 4 Oct. 2007. .

Holusha, John. "Myanmar News." New York Times 25 Sept. 2007. .

"Myanmar." Wikipedia. 09 Oct. 2007. .

First Critical Analysis

Julien Benichou
September 13th, 2007
Tom Laichas
The Other Side of History
Constant Tension

We can break down the world into three levels of analysis: the individual, the state, and international systems. The individual rules over himself, and the state rules over the individual. However, international systems (though meant to) do not rule over states. The state still has a certain amount of sovereignty which the international systems cannot fully control (we can get into the debate that the state doesn't have full control over the individual in a democracy. However, though some may disagree with me, it is the Democratic state which allows for the individual to have the right to do what he wants). Of course the international systems have laws which affect everybody like the Geneva laws or the genocide laws. But the international system has no control of the choices of the autonomous state. This means that in essence our world is anarchic: we have no leviathan (overarching supreme power). With nobody in charge of all the states, that also means no moral code can be considered universal. Every state has its own morals, and that means that one state cannot interfere with another state (even though literally they could). Here we find ourselves at the root of the norm of none-intervention (the other root being not wanting to use the recourses required in intervention). States and international systems find themselves reluctant to interfere because of this norm. In Safe Area Gorazde, Joe Sacco takes on a very liberal view of the conflict. Not only does he present the history but he also presents in some ways his opinions on the conflict. Sacco, depicting horror story after horror story, blames NATO/U.N/U.S. for not intervening sooner and with more force, but at the same time gives no solution for the obvious tension which still exists and may explode if international troops leave.

Sacco doesn't understand the idea that morals change depending on the state. Crossroads' philosophy promotes a certain amount of individuality in its students. When a state has autonomy, it can also decide for itself what it wants. It doesn't have to listen to anybody else. My old school, Le Lycee Francais de Los Angeles, promoted uniformity. The founders of Crossroads might find this promotion of uniformity completely outrageous. In the Crossroads perspective: it hurts the students' future. Students at the Lycee believe uniformity helps them be more studious. Crossroads also outnumbers Lycee by about ten to one. Why shouldn't Crossroads simply take over the Lycee by sheer force of numbers and change its policies? It would be a simple and easy way to change their policies. The Lycee kids obviously have been misled by the evil administration at their school. Yet, right when Crossroads invades, they don't find the basketball court full of cheering Lycee students. Instead they find the Lycee students fighting with all their might to push Crossroads out. This example seems foolish and childish, but it still rings true to a certain extent. Crossroads just couldn't understand why Lycee kids would like uniformity, so they decided that the Lycee kids hadn't seen the light of individuality. At the same time lets mix it up a little bit. A minority of the Lycee students, 30% to be exact, hate uniformity and want individuality. This minority finds themselves oppressed by the 70% majority. The 30% revolted, and took over half the school. Once Crossroads intervened, it created an administration with half uniformal and half individual employees. With tensions still high, xrds decided to leave good ol' Roger Weaver to make sure everything stayed under control. Yet, once Roger Weaver retired, chaos broke out again. Both these situations show a Crossroads with strict moral ideas which it willingly pushes onto others who don't agree. Soon enough Liz would be in charge of Harvard Westlake, Morgan would be in charge of Brentwood, and we would hire a new guy to make sure New Roads didn't get any ideas. Being stretched so thin, all the schools revolt against Crossroads. They don't believe in our morals, and who can blame them? How can we ever know if we've stumbled upon the correct morals? Better yet: can there be universal morals? Sacco seems to believe so. But who, as Americans, are we to tell who's wrong and who's right. With the fall of the Soviet Union, we've shift from a Bipolar world, to a Unipolar world. That means that the “bad guys” can be harder to spot. During the cold war choosing sides became easy: whoever fought against the Soviets would automatically become the allies of the U.S. and vice versa. Now the U.S. and the allies have no superpower to focus on. The U.S. cannot just look at which sides doesn't want Communism anymore. This has left the United States crippled to a certain extent on the international scene. We've lost our reasoning to intervene in countries. It probably wouldn't threaten U.S. security if South Africa decided to go Fascist. In some sense, the fall of the Soviet Union has left countries more free to choose their own path. It took a while for NATO and the U.N. to intervene because they couldn't take sides. We already know that the U.N. denied or overlooked claims that Genocide was occurring with the statements of Lieutenant Rose, “The situation was a lot better than I had been led to believe...the town had not been destroyed to the level which I expected. “ (Sacco 187) “Later, an unidentified Senior U.N. military officer—who was later identified as Lt. General Rose---claims that Gorazde's casualties had been inflated 'in order to shame the world into doing something'” (Sacco 187) This meant that the U.N. could only enter in order to create safe zones. “the U.N. top military commander in Bosnia the battle for Gorazde had endangered his peace keepers and brought the U.N. perilously close to taking sides in the war.” (Sacco 186) The U.N. couldn't take sides in the war because that meant that they considered their morals or beliefs of more importance their others'. The U.N. had to keep a certain amount of impartiality until one side committed genocide, broke with the Geneva convention, or attacked U.N. peace keeping troops. The U.N. didn't come to Bosnia to fight the Serbs (as many Bosnians thought was the case), they came to protect civilians. The U.N. couldn't fight the war for the Bosniaks, that just wouldn't be right. Until NATO came and started bombing Serb forces, the U.N. focused mainly on bringing supplies and help to those who needed it. The U.N. focused on things like the Blue Road, “Why did NATO armies, readied through the same decades to launch a thermonuclear war on a moment's notice, find it inconvenient to face down a flimsy roadblock manned by a rabble of drunken racists?” (Hitchens) They didn't find it inconvenient, the Blue Road opened because the Serbs let it open. (it was surrounded by Serb territory) At any moments notice the Serb army could have taken it over, with NATO troops completely overwhelmed. Why should the U.N./NATO have the right to say that the Serb's cause was unjust? “They're not all Chetniks, there are good people there, too” (Sacco 161) Even in the U.S. constitution it says we have the right to revolt if we feel compelled to.

How long will NATO/U.N. peace forces stay in Bosnia? Will a window for leaving ever appear? Sacco never answers the question, and I think he doesn't know the answer. Edin gave his opinion on the matter, “If this war was over, and he wasn't sure it was, then there'd be another war within 50 years, he said” (Sacco 227) Edin's view basically shows that the Dayton Accords can only impede the inevitable fate of another war. The problem lies with the actual ethnic problem, in the chapter titled “Can you live with the Serbs again?” Most answers fell along the lines of, “The Serbs can't be trusted, they lie” (Sacco 160) or “generally I don't want to see the people who've done this for another 20 or 40 years.” (Sacco 161) Sacco criticizes the U.N. and NATO for doing nothing, but what could they do that would stop the war? Even the Dayton Accords seem like a temporary peace for Bosnia. International forces understood that getting involved in the conflict could really do nothing. U.N. and NATO forces can stop the fighting, but they can never relieve the tensions. No outside force can do that, Bosnia has to figure out its own problems. I'll give an example using an Act Utilitarian perspective. Let's go back to 1992 when the war just began. The U.N. has to look at the consequences of its entering. If the U.N. enters now and stops the war, will the amount of civilians they save now, make up for the amount that will die if war breaks out later because the conflict hadn't resolved itself (which seems probable). If the conflict looks like it will start up again if international peace keepers leave the country, how long can we or should we control their affairs? How long can we expend our resources for a country which seems ready to revert to civil war? Sacco can criticize all he wants, but the Bosnians had to figure out their own problems, the U.N. couldn't force anything because that wouldn't achieve anything permanent. I understand why the U.N. felt reluctant to enter Bosnia and feel that waiting a few years to end the war, may have helped Bosnia's chances of not reverting to a civil war.

Curtin Chapter 6

Precis Curtin Chapter 6
Curtin in this chapter really focuses on administrations and their choices. He asks how these choices affected the administrations' situations in their colonies. He also asks how the European colonial governments created social consequences in the countries they controlled. He begins by stating how policy making about colonies was all good, but actually seeing it done in those colonies was a completely different matter. He then talks about how political and diplomatic history are usually more studies then administrative history. This being because there is always a sense of a game with players who make smart moves, bad moves, inefficient moves. And, of course, there are winners and losers. The new administrations were trying to gain a more centralized and efficient bureaucracy. The growth of administrative technology and organization paralleled the growth of industrial technology which allowed for much greater growth then if industrial technology had arrived on its own. European companies at first just created trade empires and trade diasporas. By the later half of the 1700s, the companies found themselves taking over territory and Asia and facing the same administrative problems as everyone else. These companies had taken over these other areas militarily, but they recognized the legitimacy of the local governors and did not want to disturb that balance. European governments were becoming totalitarian at the time, but Europeans did not have enough personnel overseas to form a totalitarian government, which meant that they had to use the local rulers in order to find any success and quell some tensions some might have had about being ruled by foreigners. Hence a system of dualism arose: both the European power and the natural rulers governed the colonial state. Advocates of dualism stated that because of racial and cultural differences, governments which worked in Europe may not work in Europe's colonies. Curtin then gives examples of European colonies under the influence of Dualism in South and Southeast Asia. He begins with Bengal. The British East India Company(BEIC) played the role of diwan of Bengal under the Mughal Empire. The BEIC used this subordinate role to mask its rise to power. In essence, “it was still a commercial firm with political and military functions on the side.”(Curtin 96) The Mughal Empire made most of its money off of revenue paid for working on the land. This meant that the Mughal Empire actually owned the land, not just had soverign control over it. The Mughals had a subordinate class called the Zamindari who collected revenue. This meant that Bengal was a very agrarian economy where the land was owned by the state, but the Zamindari controlled the land itself. The state wasn't collecting taxes or rent, it wasn't really sure what they were collecting. The BEIC, modeling off of the British system, gave the land to the Zamindari, who were responsible for paying land revenue. What ended up happening was that the original Zamindari could not pay the original high land revenue prices (the BEIC lowered these later), and had to sell the land to wealthy people outside of Bengal. The BEIC's system changed the Zamindari from being part of the local government, to rent collectors. The point Curtin tries to make with this example of Bengal, is that any new revenue policy would have drastic effects on the state in question. The central Asian state was very similar to Bengal. Under Muslim law, all land was the property of the ruler. But in general the local aristocrats and some Muslim charitable foundations actually ruled over the land. Russia declared that all the land stilled belonged to the state, but being skeptical of the aristocracy, had the people that worked the land rule over it. The only local rulers that the Russians kept were the village officials. This might seem like a revolutionary idea, but it was really meant to increase land revenue. This led to the impoverishment of the local aristocrats. When the Soviets came to power they created large collective farms. The number of settlers to Central asia allowed for there to be grassroots managers. With the local elites gone, the Soviets attempted to create a new elite class by Soviet standards. Those elites had no loyalty to the Soviets and when the Soviet Union collapsed, declared independence for their countries. The VOC in Java was an example of a different kind of administrative choice. The Bupati ruled thought a subordinate class called the priyayi. When the VOC originally arrived, they had no intention of taking over Java, but they did take Jakarta as their naval base. When the VOC took over, they recognized the Javanese leaders and called them regents. The VOC made sure that the regents controlled the peasants and told them what to produce for the European market (like coffee). When the VOC collapsed the Dutch government took over and assigned land to European planters. The Dutch were trying to create a powerful central bureaucratic government in Java. The Dutch felt the most danger from the village level religious leaders and from the western-education nationalists. In Malaya, the Siamese had the most influence. However, at the same time the Malay were ruled by various sultans. Malaya became a British protectorate where each sultan had to ask the British residents for advice. Eventually the sultans came together to the form the Malayan state The Malay had the problem of Chinese immigration and economic growth based on tin and plantations. The Malay decided to try and make a westernized government administration theoretically under the sultans, but in reality under the British residents' control. The British residents brought in British law, British officials... The sultans basically became constitutional monarchs who would only deal with culture and religion. The British needed these sultans more as representatives then as useful tools. This eventually led for the sultans to have no power, which meant that the nationalists in 1957 were the leaders leading the revolt against the British. However the sultans did not disappear, they were “kept on as a kind of corporate constitutional monarchy.”(Curtin 106)

Modern Imperialism

Modern Imperialism

Philip Curtin made some very good arguments about European industrialization and imperialism. In general I agree with most of his theories. However, it seems as though Curtin seems to think that imperialism ended in the mid/late 20th century. He's half correct: European military imperialism has ended. The top nations in the world no longer “colonize” (as Curtin considers this the wrong word) nations and create local governments. He fails to realize that a new form of imperialism has arisen: economic imperialism. Countries have given up their ideas of expansion for the security of their markets. During military imperialism, countries also sought to expand their markets, but used a different method. By imposing sovereignty over another nation they gained control of their markets. That ship has sailed; countries now control markets through investments. The costs of controlling another country have risen too high, it has lost all of its profit. The most powerful states have given up their somewhat obvious military control of other countries for the more subtle economic control of countries.

Military imperialism had become too expensive and culturally impossible to continue. There have been many technological advances since the 19th century. The advanced nations now have planes that fly three times the speed of sound, a bomb that can do massive damage, extremely well trained troops armed with the newest technologies, and a communications system which has become instantaneous. What stops countries like the U.S. from taking over other 3rd world growth oriented countries which do not have economies half as big? I see two reasons: the rise of nationalism/ideas of autonomy in poor countries during the 20th century, and the military problems which lead to economic problems by doing so. Imperialist nations of the past mostly used local governments and local armies to control their colonies, “By the late 1800s, the vast majority of the troops serving in the French, British, German, and Netherlands armies overseas were non-European and the cost of maintaining those armies fell to the local budget.” (Curtin 33) The rising nationalist movement in many countries (Serbia, China, North Korea, Iran...) makes ruling over them much more difficult, “Nationalism, in the sense of opposition to European rule, has been endemic in the colonial world from the late 1800s. Nationalism in the other sense of loyalty to people with shared language and customs can be expected to thrive where different culture are present in the same society.” (Curtin 69) The idea of one's own culture having its own autonomous nation has spread rapidly across the globe. This can be seen when areas like Kosovo, Tibet, Aceh all fight against the powers that rule over them. These countries claim their own individual culture and therefore want autonomy from rule by other cultures. This means that if a developed nation were to take over a country and create a local government, they would constantly face guerrilla wars. Now, if the developed nation decided to take central control of the country instead (maybe the thought process might involve the fact that developed nations now have faster communications and transports then before therefore there may be no need for local rulers), it would be its responsibility to fight that guerrilla war. As seen in Vietnam, an organized army has a lot of trouble fighting against guerrilla tactics, “The military lesson that emerged later in the twentieth century was that an offensive war against people with equal arms requires at least equal arms, but to defeat guerrillas armed with modern weapons requires a force that outnumber the guerrillas many times over.” (Curtin 31). With explosives so easy to make (and probably to purchase) and guns like the AK47 easy to attain, even in the poorest countries, guerrillas can find the firepower necessary to wage a war against a developed nation. This leads me to my second point: these increased military needs for keeping a nation under control also increase the amount of money needed to spend on these wars. Take the Iraq war as an example: the U.S. government has to pay the large fees of keeping its forces in Iraq, maintaining equipment, giving relief to citizens badly effected by the war, reconstruction of the Iraq economy and government, and the financial support for an Iraqi government created by the U.S.... The original 50 billion dollar tab for the operation has been completely blow out of the water. Estimates for how much the war will cost have around 320 billion. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/26/AR2006042 601601.html, Jonathan Weisman) Though the U.S. says it may pull out soon, who knows how much money this war will actually cost the U.S. governmet by the end. Aside from the actual money that the U.S. has payed, 1.1 million Iraqis have been displaced since the beginning of the war.(http://www.economist.com/research/articl esBySubject/ displaystory.cfm?subjectid=348966&story_id=9783288) This means that surrounding countries have received a huge influx of refugees. Such large displacement into other countries can cause major economic damage. This can also cause a lot of tension between the refugees and the locals who suffer because of the sudden increase in population. (Tom Laichas, you said this in class) This effects the U.S. and other developed nations in a more round about way. If the developed nations have any sort of trade going with the countries receiving the bulk of the refugees (which I'm guessing they do), the price of goods from that country will rise. It's simple: if more people have entered the country (especially illegally so they don't have to pay taxes) the government has to spend more money. This means their price for goods has to rise in order to help make up for the difference. Here again the developed nations lose money. If a conflict were to develop between the locals (who are fed up with the refugees, and probably might encourage a nationalist movement) and the refugees, again the west would suffer economically: but more on that in the paragraph.

An eternal goal has become accentuated in the last few years: grow economically as much and as fast as possible. The war has switched, developed nations no longer fight with arms but with investments. The new competitive economic drive of countries has created a new dislike for war, “It is in the conflict of opposed forces that science seeks order and equilibrium: perpetual war, according to it, is the sole means of obtaining peace; that war is called competition.” (Marx 33) As stated above, war can be very unprofitable. The exceptions to those rules can only be found in total war (like what World War 2 did to the U.S. economy). The only time the U.S. went to war with a country after World War 2 (Vietnam, Korea...), though they stated a humanitarian reason for doing so, I see a different reason. If countries like South Korea and Vietnam became communist, the U.S. might have issues with trade in a communist country (because of the Soviets at the time). This meant that they were willing to give up some money now for the prospect of trade later. The Marshall Plan also exemplified this. Communist threats started arising in countries like France and Greece, so the U.S. flowed money in to stop them. In Utilitarian terms, losing 1 billion now has utility if you make 5 billion off of it. However, its not just developed nations which do not want war. Countries like China,Vietnam...all have found their place in the world selling good to developed nations (and paving the path for them to become a developed nation). A new slogan for the world has popped up: “Make money; not war!” (Crossette) What does that mean for developed nations? They have now created international organizations under the pretext of stopping future wars (the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization). This also means that these developed nations have found a new way to control less developed nations through economic investments. Multinational Corporations (usually based in a developed nation), once deemed evil by foreign countries, have come to embrace them with open arms. Countries like China, Vietnam, South Korea all sell their goods to developed nations. This makes China completely dependent on 1st world purchases. Take Japan in Singapore as an example: it has changed its slogan from “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” to “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations”. “There are differences, of course [in Singapore]...They wear business suits instead of uniforms. They carry attache cases in stead of guns. Also, they are welcome.” (Beech) A Marxist theory states how the laborer depends more on the capitalist then the capitalist on the worker. The root of this lies in the fact that the capitalist has more money and options if something goes wrong with the workers. If something goes wrong for the capitalists the workers fall much worse. I like to think of this perspective in terms of poor states (the workers) and the rich states (the capitalists). If the world ran out of oil tomorrow the richer nations would have more of a chance to be able to fall on their feet. The richer nations would lose more money, but that would affect them less then it would affect poorer nations. The poorer nations would look to the richer nations for aid aid find nothing. By realist perspective, this huge and sudden gap in power would trigger huge tensions between the rich and poor countries. Then the search for peace could be broken by wars of power.

Works Cited

Beech, Keyes. "Japan Trade Empire Rises in Southeast." Los Angeles Times 13 Dec. 1981. ProQuest.

Crossette, Barbara. "A New Credo: Make Money; Not War." New York Times 24 Aug. 1997. ProQuest.

Curtin, Philip D. The World & the West. New York: Cambridge UP, 2000.

Kristof, Nicholas D. "Curbs Give Way to Welcome for Multinational Companies." New York Times 11 May 1985. ProQuest.

"The Toll of War." The Economist. .

Curtin Chapter 5

Curtin asks in chapter 5 how integrated plural societies came to be. He focuses on Mexico and the integration of Spanish culture there. The conquest of the Americas started much earlier then the conquest of say South Africa. The "Amerindian cultures...gradually accepted cultural elements from their European neighbors in a process often called acculturation." (Curtin 73) The Spanish Conquest of the Mexican region began in the 1520s and ended in 1570s. The Spanish rule over Mexico ended in the early 1800s. The Spanish had the most influence in Central Mexico where Euro diseases made the most impact, and the most Spanish missionaries were situated. The acceptance of Christianity in Mexico also played a key role in the acculturation. The Amerindians were able to more easily accept Christianity because it didn't fully break all of their other core beliefs. The Spanish had small minority groups in Mexico which it used mainly as administrators and soldiers. However, eventually small communities of farmers, merchants... came to be. Many Hispanic Indians joined these communities. About the same amount of Europeans came to Mexico as other plural societies like Central Asia or South Africa. The high birth rates of the European immigrants, and the natural decrease of Native Americans, led for the two populations to join together. This new Mexican culture was much more integrated then in places like South Africa and Central Asia.

Why did the same type of thing happen in North America?

Curtin Chapter 4

Curtin mainly talks about plural societies in chapter 4. Curtin asks what are the differences between Plural societies like South Africa and Soviet Central Asia? Curtin distinguishes these Plural societies as places which did not integrate. Groups of foreigners migrated in and formed their own communities in the state. Sometimes the foreigners formed a majority. As Europeans migrated to South Africa, they took the best land, the best jobs...The Africans still farmed, but in general the minority Europeans were in power. Central Asia was already extremely mixed, more so then South Africa. The Soviet Union attempted to create a common language between the five states they created, but failed. However, the amount of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants is quite noticeable. Kazakhstan, by 1911 was 40% Russian. In 1988 Soviet Central Asia had 49 million people, of which 25% were European. South Africa had 35 million people, of which 14% were white. However, both countries shared that non-Europeans grew faster in numbers then Europeans. However, the Europeans did have periods in which they rose quickly. Mainly from immigration, better diet, better health. Especially during the 1950s many people migrated to different places. However, by 1989 those numbers dropped. The Five Soviet states, except Kazakhstan, were named after their majority ethnic group. At the same time, the Russian minorities always had prominent positions, and usually were the second largest ethnic group in the country. The two areas sometimes took very similar and very different approaches to the problem of race. In terms of education, supposedly the Soviet Union advocated for equal education for everybody organized by the Communist Party. They created schools in central Asia, these really helped Russians more then anything but the attempt was there. In South Africa no attempt was there. If the Europeans had really wanted to make South Africans part of their culture they would created a system of free public education. As they didn't we see where their hearts lied. It wasn't until the 1950s that a very poor system of education was created for the South Africans. It made sense not to give them too good of an education, they were barred from the “most skilled and professional positions” anyways. Next Curtin talks about religion. Christianity had a strong hold in pre-revolutionary Russia and Colonial South Africa. Christian missionaries didn't make much of an effort to convert the Central Asian people and never had much success trying to convert Muslims. In South Africa however, they had much better chances. They ended up converting about half the South African population. Both the Soviet and South African governments “favored high productivity”. The South Africans encouraged an income barrier between races. Soviet Central Asia was a direct economy. Both areas were moderately successful. Nationalism spread among the colonies very quickly. Especially in places where multiple cultures presided. The Soviets tried to get rid of these nationalist ideas based on race and tried to form a common nationality based on language. The Soviets ended up giving five areas in Central Asia partial autonomy (as they were still under soviet rule. South Africa did the same thing with what it called homelands. The South African idea completely failed. Plural societies had ethnic problems lasting long after their European colonizers left. In fact, its because of the Europeans' rule that many of these ethnic problems exist.

If the European really wanted to keep their colonies, why didn't they try to push integration? Were there benefits for Europeans to move to those plural societies?

09/27/07

We talked about the conflict in Burma for a little while. Myanmar does not produce any oil so the U.S. has no economic interests there. At the same time the Chinese and Russians will not allow for the U.N. to step in because they have areas seeking independence. The Burmese government therefore thinks nobody will stop them if they stop the protest by force. However, if they kill the Buddhist monks, it might create a huge public uproar. The military has surrounded cities, arrested protesters, and done night raids of temples. The only way Tom Laichas sees the side opposing the government as being able to win is if the middle ranked official of the military switch sides. This would either make higher up military people flee, or create a civil war. The question now is, does the middle army have loyalty to the higher ups? The social base of the military is peasants. The only way the military will break is if the rebellion lasts these next few days. A theme that will reoccur in this class is the central state trying to monopolize legitimacy.

Britain:
Take a look at governing structure. At the end of the 19th century, most of the power was in the parliament. New people are elected to the parliament with new opinions. We can also see the colonial office's priorities vs the priorities of the central government's foreign office. Also private interests may run in conflict. Citizens with nationalistic behavior may come in conflict with other citizens. Another lesson of the year: No matter where you are, there is always tensions and people who are trying to change policy.
Neighbors of Myanmar don't want a civil war there, or for the government to be overthrown. Will they send aid to the current Burmese government? Was the parliament in England split over what to do with colonies?

09/24/07 Precis

There are three approaches to industrialization.
1. The tradition: Something in Western European culture contributed to industrial ideas.
A.The invention of invention: The Patent, the job of engineering, interests in foreign texts...
2. During the Song period in China, Chinese tech was quite advanced. They made porcelain, drilled for oil, and started exporting a lot. According to Marx, the Chinese did not change. In essence they stayed still technologically throughout history.
3. Keneth Pomeranz asks the question: when do the Chinese and Europe diverge. He says most historians are looking at England and China, but China is huge compared to England. England the Chinese province Yangzi Delta were about equal in size. Pomeranz says that England's sovereignty played a major role in distinguishing it from the Yangzi Delta. Chinese money was distributed to every province in China. They did this to ward off a rebellion, and in essence it worked. England could focus on itself while a Chinese province had to focus on China. A Chinese province had to pay taxes to China. China also had no competition around them, therefore they didn't need to make military advances. Pomeranz also asks why. England discovered the uses of coal? It had to do with the Malthusian dilemma, the higher the population, the higher the communities, more competition, eventually you will come to an economic roof. British go through that roof by finding coal. 1. Coal is very near surface, easily accessible. 2. Britain could turn to the Americas for supplies. China already had markets to the south, they had no reason to go search for America. Britain was a "fortunate freak". However, Pomeranz does not state that the other two are wrong.
This lead by the British gave it a huge advantage. By 1913, Europeans controlled most of the world. The colonization process was so quick that it shocked many people.
Even though China had defeated all of its enemies, why didn't China have a thirst for more economic power? Can the European achievements really be considered so much more advanced if their colonization only lasted such a short time?

Precis 09/25

The people in the circle discussed the financial vs power reasons for colonizing. I felt as though they had really grounded themselves in that argument. However, I just began to wonder what the reasons for decolonization were. If anything, I felt that looking at the reasons for decolonization might give a clue for the reasons for colonizing. According to Curtin, "Imperial control was of little use to the colonial powers unless they could the run the conquered territories cheaply and effectively in ways that suited their interests." Though this quote still leaves some questions unanswered, it does give us a general notion of what the European state would deal with and wouldn't. If a rebellion in the country became too costly to quell, the country would pull out (France and Algeria). The European countries needed a balance of power and costs. They weren't going to sacrifice costs in order to achieve power. Therefore in some sense both lived in perfect harmony with each other.
Is it possible however, that a country wouldn't want to lose a colony because of how much of its own culture it put into that culture? In other words the colonial power didn't care about the money or the sphere of influence. Did colonialism help the economies of any colonized countries?

Precis, the world and the west chapters 1-3

Julien Benichou
September 23rd, 2007
Tom Laichas
Other Side Of History
Precis 09/23/07

Philip Curtin uses the first three chapters to describes the process of colonialism. Curtin asks the question: “Where were the roots of the creation of these European empires?” He begins by describing how the word colonialism has come to mean something then what it actually does. He then describes how Europeans first had the advantage because of their sea power. On land, Europeans were inferior to other countries. Their ability to control the sea and travel long distances easily allowed for Europeans to create trading posts around the world. These trading posts helped boost European economies without ever needing to resort to military action. At this point in history the Europeans had no interest in taking over these countries militarily, their trading posts acquired them a lot of wealth. Curtin also describes how European countries created “hidden” empires. Most of the time the European country in question didn't actually set up a foreign government, they just created local government who followed European orders. In essence, Europe's main issue wasn't with the countries they were colonizing, it was with other European countries. They feared losing their colonies to other European rule, therefore they proclaimed sovereignty over nations in order to keep other Europeans away (though they really didn't control the country very much). When the European country didn't like what the local governments did they pressured that government to changed their policies.
How much did this sort of control aid European economies? How much did it hurt or help the colonies under European control? Did stationing troops in countries cost a large sum? Were profits from trade posts so much smaller then profits from colonies, or did the idea of power also come into play?

Curtin then asks, “how did European countries have such an edge over other countries?” The Europeans did have a weapons gap on their colonies, but that gap didn't last for very long. Europeans had one main advantage: military and administrative organization, “This victory...owed more to its organizational success in marshaling Indian resources than it did to the technological superiority of its weapons.” (Curtin 27) Good organization allowed European troops to win battles in which they could be outnumber five to one. With increased productivity and revenue, European governments began to expand in size. This gave them more administrative power which let them control foreign governments more successfully. Good administrative powers ended up being a key component to imperialism, “Imperial control was of little use to the colonial powers unless they could run the conquered territories cheaply and effectively in way that suited their interests.” (Curtin 33) European countries, after expanding into another country, formed local “militias” (couldn't really find another word for it) to fight their battles. The colonized countries' budget paid for these militias so that the European power wouldn't lose money by keeping those colonies. In some sense every colony was completely self-sufficient with European bureaucracy in the shadows. The rapid increase in medical technology also helped European countries. Without these new medical advances European armies would lose vast amount of soldiers to foreign diseases.
Curtin describes that the weapons gap didn't make much of a difference, but couldn't it be that because Europeans already had training with those weapons they had also had more organizational skill with those weapons? Couldn't that time period where they did have the advantage give them strategic advantages?

Curtin then asks, “why did European powers expand in the first place?” Many people argued the Marxist point of view. European industrialization created more funds then European economies could actually withstand. Therefore most people, “tended to be diverted overseas in search of higher profits or higher interest rates in a less competitive market.” (Curtin 38) Europe needed new cheaper markets to fuel their economies, and what better way then to expand overseas to “less developed” nations. He then describes how most obvious empires (declared by the state) didn't last very long. The most obvious being the British in India and the French in Algeria. In some sense, the central governments of France in Britain really controlled what happened in these regions. However, in most cases the local governments had no idea of the intentions of the European government. They only saw things locally and couldn't relate it back to a global scale. This meant that a lot of European central governments didn't have full control over their colonies. They only influenced the local governments who had full control. This meant that sometimes countries would expand un-intentionally. Take the Burmese conflict. The central government in London had an anti-expansionist perspective. However, the local government in Calcutta decided to annex Burma without ever getting permission from the central government in London. Many local governments felt that though the central government may be anti-expansionist their situations could be considered exceptions. Also the cheap costs of annexing other countries made it that much easier. However, this ended up creating a lot of costs for the local governments' European counterpart. Though one conflict resulting in the annexation of another country could be cheap, ten similar conflict can add up. Not to mention this meant that European governments could spread themselves very thin.
If these situations like the one with Burma were completely un-intentional on the part of the Europeans, why didn't they make more of an effort to stop them? Can a country really claim to be anti-expansionist when you still control colonies?